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The paper develops a modeling framework to study how sustainability interventions impact consumer
adoption of durable goods innovation, firm profit and environmental outcomes in equilibrium. Our two period
model with forward looking consumers and a monopoly firm introducing an innovation in the second period
accommodates three key features: (1) it builds on the psychology literature linking reactive and anticipatory
guilt to consumers’ environmental sensitivity on initial purchase and upgrade decisions; (2) it disentangles
environmental harm over the product life into that arising from product use and dumping at replacement;
and (3) it clarifies how a taxonomy of innovations (function, fashion and use-efficiency) differ in how they
provide value and cause environmental harm during use and dumping. Given how guilt impacts environmental sensitivity, the model allows for owners upgrading a product to be more environmentally sensitive than
first time buyers; this makes dumping harm and in-use harm from products not fungible. We find that with
fashion and function innovations, increasing consumer sensitivity to environmental harm can surprisingly
result in increased environmental harm. Further, when consumers are very sensitive to environmental harm,
firms will not inform (pre-announce to) consumers about the impending arrival of use-efficiency innovation;
to minimize environmental harm, a sustainability advocate needs to inform consumers. Thus, contrary to
conventional wisdom, consumer environmental sensitivity does not always substitute for the role of sustainability advocates. Our results clarify how to design win-win policies for firms and the environment; and when
advocates have complementary/adversarial roles relative to firms to achieve sustainability goals.
Key words : Durable goods, Planned Obsolescence, Sustainability, Innovation, Environmental Costs

* The authors are grateful for insightful discussions and comments from Soheil Ghili, Vineet Kumar, Robyn LeBoeuf, Xinxin
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Introduction

Innovation and planned obsolescence have long been regarded as drivers of economic prosperity.
Over the last century, as technological advances generated surplus production capacity relative to
consumer demand, an emphasis on consumption-driven economic growth led to firms accelerating
product obsolescence to induce consumers to replace goods even when the product is working.
This idea of routinely obsoleting products through styling changes was symbolized by the “annual
model changes” pioneered by General Motors in the 1920’s to induce customers to replace cars even
when they were still working well. Planned obsolescence was justified as a means of job creation,
growth and prosperity.1 To be sure, innovation and obsolescence are not merely about styling and
fashion changes, but also a means to improve product function and operational efficiency that
reduces use cost. Planned obsolescence is now common across many industries including clothing,
electronics and household appliances. In turn, consumer behavior has evolved to where accelerated
replacement of goods in pursuit of fashion, function and use efficiency is the norm.
But planned obsolescence and frequent consumer upgrades have imposed a steep environmental
cost in terms of trash generated, to the point where it is by now well beyond society’s capacity
to absorb such trash. Early on, concerns that such consumption created unnecessary waste were
brushed aside as a necessary cost of pursuing economic prosperity in a modern society.2 By the
end of the 20th century, however, the negative impact of runaway human production and consumption on the environment has become more visible and tangible, and concerns about the long-term
1

J. Gordon Lippincott, the industrial designer who designed the Campbell soup label noted: “Any method that can

motivate the flow of merchandise to new buyers will create jobs and work for industry and hence national prosperity...
Our custom of trading in our automobiles every year, of having a new refrigerator, vacuum cleaner or electric iron
every three or four years is economically sound” (Whiteley 1993).
2

In a representative sentiment at the height of the Great Depression, Earnest Elmo Calkins, an advertising pioneer

referred to as the “Dean of Advertising Men” justified changing consumer norms around thrift, reuse and recycling
in a 1932 essay: “Does there seem to be a sad waste in the process? Not at all. Wearing things out does not produce
prosperity, but buying things does. Thrift in the industrial society in which we now live consists of keeping all of the
factories busy. Any plan which increases the consumption of goods is justifiable if we believe prosperity is a desirable
thing.” See “What consumer engineering really is” as reprinted in (Gorman 2003), p.131.

2
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sustainability of this production and consumption path have became more mainstream. The environmental impact of such waste is by now universally acknowledged as one of the fastest-growing
pollution problems worldwide (e.g., Babu et al. 2007, Kang and Schoenung 2005, Wong et al. 2007,
Cui and Zhang 2008, Kiddee et al. 2013). To put the problem in perspective, electronic waste
(e-waste) alone generated 49.3 million tons in 2016, the equivalent in weight of 25 million cars.
The potential value of raw materials in this e-waste is e55 billion, more than the GDP of many
countries. Yet only 20% of this material was properly tracked and recycled.3 The clothing sector
(especially fast fashion) is increasingly another major driver of environmental waste, increasing
from 1.7 million tons of textiles dumped into landfills in 1960 to 11.2 million tons in 2017.4
In response, many sustainability interventions targeted towards consumers and firms have been
proposed to mitigate environmental harm, while balancing consumer consumption needs and firm
profitability. Demand side interventions targeted at consumers include consumer education and
consumer taxes proportional to environmental harm. Similarly, supply side interventions include
mandates to reduce environmental harm in production, use and disposal or firm-side taxes on
products in proportion to environmental harm.
The purpose of this paper is to develop a modeling framework to study how sustainability interventions impact consumer adoption of innovation, firm profit, and overall environmental outcomes.
We develop a two period model with forward-looking consumers and a monopolist firm that has
one product in the market in the first period, and then introduces an innovation in the second
period. Consumers buy not only based on price and value, but also environmental harm. We then
solve for optimal firm strategies in subgame perfect equilibrium using backward induction, to assess
the equilibrium outcomes in terms of firm profit and environmental harm.
3

E-waste includes discarded phones, computers, refrigerators, printers, televisions and any electronic device. E-waste

has many toxic chemicals such as barium, lead and mercury, whose improper disposal creates serious health hazards.
Estimates are from the Global E-waste Statistics Partnership. (https://globalewaste.org/what-is-e-waste/)
4

See EPA estimates at https://www.epa.gov/facts-and-figures-about-materials-waste-and-recycling/

textiles-material-specific-data
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We highlight three key features of our model: (i) modeling consumer sensitivity to environmental harm; (ii) disentangling environmental harm over the life cycle arising from product use and
dumping the product at replacement; and (iii) a taxonomy of innovations (function, fashion and
use-efficiency) that differ in how they provide incremental consumer value and cause environmental
harm. First, we build on the behavioral literature linking consumer guilt to environmental sensitivity and sustainable choices. In the behavioral literature, guilt is widely considered as the primary
mechanism driving sustainability behaviors (Antonetti and Maklan 2014, Schneider et al. 2017)
and more broadly pro-social behaviors (e.g., Coulter et al. 1999). The psychology literature on
guilt (e.g., Baumeister et al. 2007, Tangney et al. 2007) claims that guilt drives behaviors through
an emotional feedback loop, where a past immoral, anti-social or unsustainable behavior evokes
the guilty emotion (reactive guilt), which then serves to restrain such future behaviors through
anticipatory guilt.5 In the context of our problem, this implies that first time consumers in the
category, who have not yet experienced reactive guilt are not sensitive to environmental harm, but
those considering upgrades who have experienced reactive guilt after their initial purchase experience anticipatory guilt and are sensitive to environmental harm. Accordingly, in the model, we
assume that first time buyers do not consider environmental harm at time of purchase, but those
who consider upgrading do. We later assess the importance of modeling this behavioral finding
by comparing these results with a model when first time buyers also perceive some sensitivity to
environmental harm at the time of of purchase.
Second, in assessing environmental harm, we recognize the role of “life cycle analysis” to assess
total environmental impact (Chang et al. 2014). For our purposes, we partition the total environmental impact of a product into an in-use harm component arising from usage during ownership
5

Baumeister et al. (2007) notes the sequence of guilt emotion feedback on choice that arises from a past immoral or

anti-social action: “First came the act, then guilt, and the guilt in turn prompted a change in later behavior, which
was chosen to avoid further guilt.” Tangney et al. (2007) also clarifies the role of history on anticipatory guilt and its
effect on behavior thus: “In our view, people’s anticipatory emotional reactions are typically based on history—that
is, based on their past consequential emotions in reactions to similar actual behaviors and events.”

4
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of the product and dumping harm component when the product is replaced. As a shorthand, we
label the ratio of per unit use harm to per unit dumping harm as “use-dump harm ratio” (λ).
Examples of products with high use-dump harm ratio are cars, washing machines, air conditioners,
where ongoing usage during the typical product’s life cycle requires significant fuel consumption
and therefore creates large use cost related environmental harm, relative to the cost of dumping
the item when it is replaced. Examples of products with small use-dump harm ratio are clothes,
computers and televisions, as the ongoing energy consumption and environmental harm is relatively small during use. The use-dump harm ratio serves as a useful construct with explanatory
power in how sustainability interventions impact equilibrium profit and environmental harm.6
Finally, we consider a taxonomy of three types of innovation—function, fashion and use efficiency.
Each differs in terms of how they provide value to the customer and how they cause environmental
harm. Specifically, function innovations improve the value of the new product by the addition of
useful new features; fashion innovations incentivize replacement, by reducing the perceived value
of the current product when a newer, more fashionable version is introduced; and use efficiency
innovations reduce the operating cost relative to the existing product (e.g., an appliance with
increased energy efficiency). All durable goods have an ongoing usage cost, and generate ongoing
environmental harm while they are in use. Use-efficiency innovations save customers money in use
(e.g., fuel/electricity savings), and also reduce in-use harm. All three types of innovations lead to
dumping harm at replacement, when consumers upgrade.
Table 1 provides illustrative examples of different types of innovations with low and high usedump harm ratios. It is important to note that use-dump ratio can be high or low for fashion,
function and use-efficiency innovations. By fashion goods, we do not simply refer to clothes or
accessories, but also to high-ticket durable goods like cars and refrigerators. Apart from their
6

Weiss et al. (2000) notes that 75% of a car’s lifetime carbon emissions arise from the fuel it burns,

not its production, which is only 6%. Even for a recent highly fuel efficient Volkswagen Golf, 68% of
the car’s lifetime emissions came from driving it. See https://www.greencarreports.com/news/1093657_
buying-a-new-car-is-greener-than-driving-an-old-one-really.
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Innovation Type Low λ

High λ

Fashion

Clothes, Handbags: Style Update

Cars, Refrigerators: Style Update

Function:

Rice Cooker, TV: Feature Update

Cars, Heaters, A/C: Feature Update

Use Efficiency

Rice Cooker, TV: Efficiency Update Cars, Heaters, A/C: Efficiency Update

Table 1

5

Examples of innovation types with different use-dump harm ratios

intrinsic utility, these high ticket items also frequently serve as a fashion statement for their owners.
Similarly functional innovations in categories like rice cookers and TVs with new features have low
use-dump harm ratio, while energy hungry products like cars, air conditioners and home heating
furnaces have high harm dump ratios. Finally, the above products could also improve on use
efficiency. For example, newer flat screen TVs and hybrid/electric cars improve on energy efficiency.
We apply our dynamic modeling framework to study two types of consumer-targeted sustainability initiatives and their equilibrium impact on market outcomes: consumer choice/surplus, firm
profit, environmental harm and social surplus. The first initiative involves increasing environmental sensitivity among consumers through education or other means so that consumers more fully
account for the environmental harm of their choices. The second involves programs that inform
and alert consumers about the arrival of new use-efficiency innovations required by time-targeted
regulatory mandates.7 Such knowledge can help consumers who value use-efficiency and reduced
environmental harm time their purchases around the introduction of the more efficient innovation, but usually consumer awareness tends to be limited. While in some cases, firms tend to
support such mandates and embrace them, the industry often pushes back on such regulations
(e.g., https://cei.org/blog/safe-rule-examined-part-4-consumer-choice). Our framework
allows us to assess when firms would voluntarily educate consumers in advance about the arrival
7

Governments often mandate energy efficiency standards with target dates—thus often use-efficiency innovations

are expected at certain periods. In the US, the federal government mandates and updates energy use standards on
an ongoing basis. Various states also pass laws mandating such standards when they are not preempted by federal
standards. California is often the leader in setting energy efficiency mandates. Other states may follow California,
or legislate their own standards. For example, Connecticut enacted efficiency standards through their own legislative
actions in 2004, 2007 and 2011.

6
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of the use-efficiency innovation and when they would not, by comparing firm profits when consumers are informed/not informed in advance about the arrival of the use-efficiency innovation.
This would allow sustainability education focused organizations (either governmental or NGOs) to
decide when they can rely on businesses to voluntarily inform consumers in advance of the arrival
of use-efficiency innovations, and when they need to step in to inform and educate the market in
advance to obtain the maximum reduction in environmental harm from the mandate.
Our key findings are as follows. First, and surprisingly, we find conditions in which an increase
in consumers’ environmental sensitivity leads to increased environmental harm for function and
fashion innovations. Specifically, we find that for function and fashion innovations that have high
use-dump harm ratio, increasing green sensitivity among consumers can lead to greater environmental harm in equilibrium. The mechanism is as follows: Consumers’ higher environmental sensitivity
reduces their willingness to upgrade, which in turn leads the firm to reduce the new innovation’s
price. This reduction in price increases purchases of the good by lower valuation first-time buyers
who would not have purchased otherwise, which in turn increases in-use environmental harm. The
total environmental harm (reduced dumping harm, but greater in-use harm) increases (decreases)
with consumers’ green sensitivity, when the use-dump harm ratio is high (low). Further, despite
these purchases by low valuation consumers, overall firm profit decreases as increased environmental sensitivity leads to lower prices and quantity of upgrades. However, unlike with function and
fashion innovations, with use efficiency innovations, environmental harm always decreases with
increasing consumer green sensitivity. The effect on firm profit with use efficiency innovations is
however nuanced. In categories where the use-dump harm ratio is high (low), firm profit increases
(decreases) with increasing consumer environmental sensitivity.
We find that these results are related to the behavioral assumption based on the role of guilt
on environmental sensitivity that first time buyers are less sensitive than upgraders. The result
that increasing environmental sensitivity leads to greater environmental harm for function and
fashion innovations (for high levels of λ) remains robust up to a threshold level of environmental
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sensitivity even among first time buyers, but once beyond the threshold, greater environmental
sensitivity does reduce environmental harm. Overall, this highlights the importance of accounting
for behavioral theories and its impacts on sustainable behaviors in analytical models to draw
equilibrium implications.
The differences in the sign of the impact of consumer environmental sensitivity on profit and environmental harm for function, fashion and use efficiency innovations give insight into whether firms
or environmental advocates should take the initiative with educating consumers about environmental harm: when increased consumer sensitivity leads to higher firm profit, firms have a natural
incentive to educate consumers and increase environmental sensitivity, but otherwise, environmental advocates have to step in. It also provides the insight that increasing consumer environmental
sensitivity could lead to a greater movement by firms towards use efficiency innovations (relative
to function or fashion innovations) in categories where in-use harm dominates dumping harm.
Second, we find that the firm’s incentive to inform consumers in advance about use efficiency
innovations given equilibrium profit outcomes is often (but not always) misaligned with environmental outcomes. Interestingly alignment occurs only when consumer environmental sensitivity is
low, and the use-dump harm ratio is high; and regulators/NGOs can follow a laissez faire policy
on informing consumers about such innovations. Surprisingly, when use-dump harm ratio is high
and there is high environmental sensitivity, firms will not alert consumers about the use efficiency
innovation but the environment is better off if consumers are alerted in advance. This suggests that
environmental advocates (or regulators themselves) need to step in to alert consumers in such high
λ categories. This leads to the surprising finding that environmental advocacy groups (and regulators) may need to play an active role in helping the environment precisely when consumers are
highly environmentally sensitive.8 The finding goes against the conventional wisdom that increas8

Environmental groups are often involved in push and pull advocacy towards environmental goals. Examples of push

advocacy include building support among stakeholders for new and updated standards at the national and state
levels. Examples of pull advocacy include consumer outreach and education. Often they also organize and coordinate
collective efforts across consumer and environmental groups, utility companies and state government agencies across
multiple states. An example of an advocacy group is the “Appliance Standards Awareness Project” (ASAP).

8
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ing consumer sensitivity about the environment can be a substitute for environmental advocacy or
regulator actions.
Overall, our work provides qualitative guidance on the role of firms, regulators and environmental
advocates in sustainability debates. In recent years, there have been intense discussions of whether
it pays to be green, i.e., whether environmentally beneficial actions are also profitable for firms—
with vigorous arguments on both sides (e.g., Hart and Ahuja 1996, Orsato 2006, Ambec and Lanoie
2008, Orsato 2009, Esty and Simmons 2011). Our work provides structure within an economic
modeling framework in one context—durable goods innovation—to assess when environmental and
firm profit will be aligned and it pays to be green. When there is such win-win alignment, we can
expect firms to automatically choose environmentally aligned polices; regulators can use a laissez
faire approach with firms to obtain environmentally aligned outcomes. It also gives qualitative
guidance of when such alignment will not occur and regulators and environmental advocates may
need to step in and be adversarial with firms to obtain desirable environmental outcomes.
In summary, the paper makes the following contributions to the literature on sustainability marketing of durable goods. Overall, we develop a two-period modeling framework of consumer product
replacement for new innovations that account for environmental sensitivity endogenized within a
model of firm pricing, where both consumers and firms are forward looking. The model incorporates three key features useful for analysis of sustainable markets. First, building on the psychology
literature on the role of “guilt” in sustainability choices, the model accounts for differential levels of environmental sensitivity among upgraders versus first-time buyers. Second, we distinguish
between the environmental harm over the product life in terms of in-use harm and dumping harm;
and show that the use-dump harm ratio is an important construct in characterizing equilibrium
outcomes. Finally, conceptually, we introduce a taxonomy of innovations—fashion, function, and
use efficiency with different consumer value propositions and environmental harm. We use this
modeling framework to evaluate the equilibrium outcomes of sustainability initiatives. Specifically,
we study how consumer environmental sensitivity and use efficiency innovation pre-announcements
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affect equilibrium outcomes; the results provide insights on designing win-win policies for firms,
consumers and the environment, and on when advocates/regulators need to be adversarial with
firms to achieve desired sustainability goals.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. §2 describes the related literature. §3 lays out the
model. We introduce our two-period model of innovation and product obsolescence, where we model
a forward looking consumer’s innovation adoption and replacement, and the forward looking firm’s
model of pricing. We then first characterize innovation taxonomy within the modeling framework. §4
discusses the analysis of increasing consumer green sensitivity on equilibrium outcomes. §5 discusses
the analysis of how pre-announcements of use efficiency innovations impact the equilibrium by
impacting consumer expectations about the arrival of the innovation. §6 concludes.

2.

Literature Review

We relate our work to several streams of the literature. The first is the consumer behavior literature
on consumption of sustainable goods, with a specific focus on how guilt drives sustainable (and more
generally prosocial) behaviors. The second stream involves economic models of how sustainability
in manufacturing and product development impact market outcomes and is related in spirit to our
approach. In terms of modeling, our paper is closely related to the industrial organization literature
on product obsolescence in durable goods.
2.1.

Consumer Behavior and Sustainability Choices

A rich consumer behavior literature has studied the growing segment of “green” consumers, who
are generally oriented toward buying and consuming environmentally friendly products (e.g., Haws
et al. 2014, 2012, White et al. 2019). They find that such “green” consumers not only consider
environmental harm during purchase, but are also willing to retain products longer and recycle
them more to reduce environmental harm (Haws et al. 2012). The literature however notes an
attitude-behavior gap in consumer’s stated intentions and sustainability behaviors; according to
recent survey 65% of respondents said they want to buy purpose-driven brands that advocate sustainability, yet only about 26% actually did. White et al. (2019) catalog a variety of tactics dubbed

10
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“SHIFT” framework, by which to reduce the attitude-behavior gap. Tactics include information
provision (e.g., eco-efficiency labels), educating consumers about environmental harm (e.g., Barth
et al. 2012), social, emotional and financial nudges (price, taxes) (e.g. Winterich et al. 2019).
Guilt is widely considered in the literature as the key driver of sustainable behavior in its ability to
motivate “reparative and preventative action” (Schneider et al. 2017). Following Rawlings (1970),
a large literature has distinguished how three forms of guilt (reactive, anticipatory and existential
guilt) impact prosocial behaviors in general (Coulter and Pinto 1995, Coulter et al. 1999) and
sustainable behaviors in particular (Antonetti and Maklan 2014, Onwezen et al. 2013, Bamberg
and Möser 2007).9 In our context, reactive guilt from past consumption fuels anticipatory guilt
regarding future consumption, which in turn influences consumers’ utility and decision choices,
because “anticipatory guilt occurs before buying and reactive guilt occurs after buying” (Bei et al.
2007, Rawlings 1970). As discussed earlier in the introduction, since reactive guilt is a response to
past violations, it does not directly impact choice, but it induces anticipatory guilt when making
future choices involving similar guilt inducing behaviors (Baumeister et al. 2007, Tangney et al.
2007). We operationalize this idea of how guilt impacts sustainable choice by allowing environmental
harm to be accounted for only by upgraders, but not by first time buyers.
2.2.

Economic Models of Sustainability Initiatives

Our work is in the tradition of a small, but growing literature that uses economic models to assess
the environmental impact of “sustainability initiatives” by firms and regulators. The approach is to
model how consumers and firm choices change in response to the sustainability initiative of interest
and then assess the overall environmental impact in equilibrium. We begin with models focused
on potentially “environmentally friendly” firm actions. For example, Chen (2001) studies product
line decisions of a monopolist in markets with heterogeneous preferences among consumers for
environmentally desirable features. The paper argues that “distortion” at the low end to prevent
9

Existential guilt, based on guilt induced due to one’s better fortune relative to others (favorable inequality) is of

limited relevance for sustainable consumption; so we focus on reactive and anticipatory guilt here.

Sudhir, Shankar and Jin: Environmental Impact of Durable Goods Innovation

11

environmentally conscious consumers from buying the less environmentally friendly product can
lead to more harmful environmental outcomes than would have been if the monopolist was restricted
to just one product. Similarly, Agrawal and Ülkü (2013) show that modular manufacturing, often
seen as an eco-friendly form of production may lead to greater environmental harm because of its
heterogeneous impacts on production by firms and the use and replacement choices of consumers.
Agrawal et al. (2012) and Mutha et al. (2021) show how a firm’s decision to lease may on the surface
reduce dumping harm by greater reuse the product over its full life, but can worsen environmental
harm due to other strategic choices by firms such as product life. Finally, others have studied how
firm efforts to signal environmental quality through external versus self-certification in competitive
markets impact overall environmental outcomes (e.g., Murali et al. 2019).
In terms of regulatory actions, research has studied the environmental impact of various taxes.
For example, Sevigny (1998) and Fullerton and West (2002) study emissions taxes (or taxes based
on engine sizes and mileage) targeted to consumers or firms. Fullerton (1997) and Williams (2002)
study the effect of taxes for environmental harm during production. Others have considered the
effects of extended producer responsibility (EPR) in legislation by making the seller financially
responsible for the recovery and environmentally friendly disposal of products they sell (Lifset et al.
2013) and its implications for product design (Gui et al. 2018, Alev et al. 2020, Huang et al. 2019).
2.3.

Durable goods obsolescence and new product preannouncements

The paper is related to the literature on durable goods obsolescence and innovation preannouncements. In terms of the model, the paper is closest to the literature on product obsolescence.
New product introductions in durable goods make the extant stock of products with consumers
obsolete to varying degree, encouraging consumers to upgrade to new products. This has led to a
number of fundamental questions related to product obsolescence (Bulow 1986, Waldman 1996) and
the resulting pricing dynamics across time (Levinthal and Purohit 1989, Dhebar 1994, Fudenberg
and Tirole 1998, Kornish 2001).
Our model structure is most closely related to Levinthal and Purohit (1989) and Fudenberg and
Tirole (1998); like them, we use a two-period model where a firm sells a product to a unit mass

12
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of consumers with heterogeneous valuations in the first period. The firm then introduces a new
product in the second period, and then endogenously sets prices in the first and second period
allowing for both consumers and firms to be forward looking. Consumers take into account not only
first period prices, but also expectations of second period prices and the extent of improvement in
the product in the second period as they decide whether to buy in the first period. Durability creates
competition in period two between the older version and the newer version. In the second period
firms have to consider both those who are upgrading and those who are buying newly in the second
period. Thus like Fudenberg and Tirole (1998), our model involves both static price discrimination
across high and low valuation customers as well as inter-temporal price discrimination across early
and late purchasers.
We contribute to this literature in two ways. First, we introduce a taxonomy of durable goods
innovation—fashion, function and use efficiency innovation—based on (a) structural differences
in how they provide incremental value to consumers/obsolete existing products, and (b) separate
sources of environmental harm. Second, in modeling sensitivity to environmental harm in consumer
choice, based on the behavioral literature linking “guilt” to environmental choices, we allow consumers choosing to upgrade to display greater sensitivity to environmental harm relative to first
time buyers.
The research question of whether sustainability advocates need to intervene to inform consumers
about the arrival of a new “green” use-efficiency innovation required by time targeted efficiency
mandates is related to the literature on “pre-announcements” (e.g., Eliashberg and Robertson 1988,
Bayus et al. 2001). Much of the literature on pre-announcements discuss its competitive advantages
(e.g., Farrell and Saloner 1986; see Choi et al. (2005) for a review) and signaling roles (e.g., Eliashberg and Robertson 1988, see Su and Rao (2010) for a review). Also, pre-announcements of green
products to signal sustainability credentials (“potential greenwashing”) have been studied (e.g.,
Truong and Pinkse 2019). This paper is more closely related to the literature on pre-announcements
that focuses on changing consumer expectations about product arrival and its impact on timing of
consumer purchases (Ishihara and Kim 2018).

Sudhir, Shankar and Jin: Environmental Impact of Durable Goods Innovation

3.

13

The Model

We describe a two period monopoly market of forward looking consumers and firms, in which an
innovation is introduced in the second period. We also characterize the three types of innovations:
function, fashion and use efficiency.
3.1.

The Market

We consider a two period market with first and second periods denoted by t = 1, 2, where a
monopolist initially offers a product j = 1 in period 1 and then introduces an innovation, a new
product j = 2 in period 2. Forward looking consumers decide whether to buy in the first period
or postpone purchases to the second period. Those who have bought in the first period have to
decide whether to continue using the product bought in the first period, or buy the second period
product. Note that in the second period, only the new product j = 2 is available for purchase,
though past buyers of product 1 can continue to use it. Figure 1 shows the timeline of the model.
Consumers perceive the vertical quality of the initial product (i.e., the product offered in period
1) to be q11 during period 1, and the perceived vertical quality of the innovation offered in period
2 to be q22 . To the extent that innovations cannot reduce quality, we expect q22 ≥ q11 . q12 is the
perceived quality of the initial product during period 2; since consumers may perceive a depreciation
regarding the quality of the initial product in period 2, we assume q12 ≤ q11 . Let ej indicate a
measure of use efficiency of the product in period j and impacts consumer utility by impacting
product usage cost. To the extent that innovations do not worsen products, we expect e2 ≥ e1 .
While an increase in product quality increases flow utility, an in-use efficiency impacts not only flow
utility due to the reduced costs of use, but it also impacts choice through reduced environmental
harm.
For model parsimony, we combine the benefits from product quality qj and use efficiency ej
into an effective quality function g(qj , ej ), where g is weakly increasing in qj and ej . Let the
consumer type θ be uniformly distributed in the interval [0, 1]. Therefore the flow utility from
consumption obtained by a consumer of type θ from a product of effective quality g(qj , ej ) in period

14
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j is θg(qj , ej ).10 In the period of purchase/upgrade, the consumer utility is reduced from the above
flow utility by price pj .
Further, the utility is impacted by environmental harm. We consider two types of environmental
harm from the product: harm from ongoing use and harm from dumping. We specify the pollution
generated by the product in use as 1 − ej , a decreasing function of use efficiency. Let λu be the harm
per unit of pollution generated by the product; therefore the environmental harm from product use
in any period is given by λu (1 − ej ).11 The harm from dumping the used product at replacement
is denoted by λd per unit product discarded. We denote the use-dump harm ratio as λ =

λu
,
λd

the ratio of the in-use environmental harm, to the dumping environmental harm. As discussed
in the introduction (p.3 of §1), based on the behavioral literature linking guilt and sustainability
behaviors, we assume that only upgraders consider environmental harm when making choices, and
that first time buyers do not at the time of purchase. The unit cost of production of both the
initial and new product is constant and fixed at c (which we later normalize to 1 without loss of
generality).
Consumers are forward looking with respect to flow utilities (current and future), prices and
disutility from environmental harm. For example, a consumer who considers purchasing in period
1 will consider (i) flow utility from consumption in period 1 and the price; (ii) flow utility from
continuing to use the old product in period 2, versus the flow utility and price to be paid for an
upgrade; and (iii) the environmental harm from use (either old or upgrade) in period 2 (due to reactive guilt for past behavior) and environmental harm from potential dumping (due to anticipatory
guilt) in case of upgrade.
10

While it is possible to have different marginal impact of utility from qj and ej , by combining vertical quality and

use efficiency allows us to parsimoniously account for consumer valuation of quality with a single parameter θ. In our
main analysis, we consider the functional form g(qj , ej ) = qj /(1 − ej ) as it leads to analytically tractable solutions.
Our results are robust to other functional forms (e.g., additive g(qj , ej ) = qj − (1 − ej )) and multiplicative (e.g.,
g(qj , ej ) = qj (1 + ej )), but these require numerical solutions.
11

Note that ej impacts separates two aspects of utility: a more efficient product (e.g. car with greater fuel efficiency)

provides greater utility in-use (e.g. lower fuel bill) that is captured through the g(qj , ej ) term and a lower disutility
from lower environmental harm captured through the λu (1 − ej ) term.
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No Purchase
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purchase (Y/N)

product 2
purchase (Y/N)

Time

Timeline of Game

If the consumer’s marginal disutility from environmental harm is a constant κ ∈ [0, 1], the disutility from in-use harm is κλu (1 − ej ) and the disutility from dumping harm is κλd .
Since first time buyers do not consider environmental harm, the flow utility Ujt for a first time
user (denoted by superscript f ) using product j ∈ 1, 2 in the corresponding periods t ∈ 1, 2 can be
denoted as
f
U11
= θq1

1
1
f
− p1 and U22
= θq2
− p2
1 − e1
1 − e2

(1)

where pj is the price of product j.
Since current owners (denoted by subscript o) consider environmental harm from in-use and
dumping in their flow utilities, their flow utilities are:
o
U12
= θδq1

1
1
o
− κλu (1 − e1 ) and U22
= θq2
− p2 − κ(λu (1 − e2 ) + λd )
1 − e1
1 − e2

(2)

In the above expressions, κλu (1 − ej ) reflects the consumer’s environmental disutility from product
usage for a product whose use efficiency is indexed by ej , and κλd represents the disutility from
dumping the older version.
In general, the modeling framework above can accommodate a variety of innovations as well as
sustainability initiatives, as we discuss next.
3.2.

Innovation Taxonomy

We classify innovation in durable goods along three types: function, fashion and use efficiency.
Within the two period framework of innovations described above, we model the three types of
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Period 1
Period 2
Product 1 Product 1 Product 2
q22 > q11 , δ = 1, e1 = e2 = 0
q11
q12 = q11
q22 > q11

Function Innovation:
Effective Quality
Environmental Harm
In-Use
λu
λu
λu
Dumping
NA
λd
NA
Fashion Innovation:
q22 > q11 , 0 ≤ δ < 1, e1 = e2 = 0
Effective Quality
q11
q12 = δq11 q22 = q11
Environmental Harm
In-Use
λu
λu
λu
Dumping
NA
λd
NA
Use Efficiency Innovation:
q22 = q11 , δ = 1, e2 = e > e1 = 0
q11
Effective Quality
q11
q12 = q11
q22 = (1−e)
Environmental Harm
In-Use
λu
λu
λu (1 − e)
Dumping
NA
λd
NA
Table 2

Innovation Taxonomy

innovation in terms of their initial quality, quality depreciation, use cost and environmental harm.
Table 2 summarizes the innovation taxonomy.
1. Function innovation: The innovation sold in period 2 is superior in perceived quality than the
initial product sold in period 1, i.e., q22 > q11 . (For example, consider anti-lock braking systems in
cars.) Further, there is no depreciation of perceived quality of period-1 product in period 2, i.e.,
q12 = q11 . The use efficiency of products sold in period 1 and period 2 are equal, i.e., e2 = e1 .
2. Fashion innovation: When the fashion innovation is introduced with perceived quality q22 , it has
the same perceived quality as the original product introduced in period 1, i.e., q22 = q11 , but the
product bought in period 1 has depreciated in perceived quality, i.e., q12 = δq11 , where 0 < δ < 1
is the depreciation factor. (For instance, consider style changes in successive generations of car
models.) The use efficiency of the products sold in period 1 and period 2 are equal, i.e., e2 = e1 .
3. Use efficiency innovation: The perceived quality of the use efficiency innovation in period 2 is
the same as that of the product introduced in period 1, i.e., q22 = q11 . There is also no depreciation
in quality of product bought in period 1, q12 = q11 . But the use efficiency for period 2 product
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is higher i.e., e2 > e1 . (For example, consider newer versions of cars with higher fuel efficiency.)
Without loss of generality, we normalize e1 to 0 and e2 to e for the use efficiency innovation case.
For function and fashion innovation cases, we normalize e to be 0. The higher the e, the more
use-efficient the product.
3.3.

Equilibrium Analysis and Outcomes

We solve the model by backward induction. To solve for the equilibrium, we assume the threshold
structure of purchases and upgrades in equilibrium as presented in Figure 2 and then verify that
it holds in the solution.12 In period 1, buyers with types in the range [θ1 , 1] buy the initial version
q1 . The threshold buyer θ1 is indifferent between buying q1 in period 1, and waiting and buying
q2 in period 2. In period 2, buyers in the range [θ2 , θ1 ) buy the newer version q2 for the first time.
The threshold buyer θ2 is indifferent between buying q2 , and buying nothing. In period 2, buyers
in the range [θ12 , 1] upgrade to the newer version. The threshold buyer θ12 is indifferent between
upgrading to q2 , and continuing to use q1 . Given the flow utilities per period discussed in §3.1, we
can characterize the total utility across both periods for the three different segments of consumers
who purchase in at least one of the two periods.
1. Purchase q1 in period 1, upgrade to q2 in period 2: Consumers in range (θ12 , 1) have total
f
o
.
utility U12 = U11
+ U22

2. Purchase q1 in period 1, do not upgrade in period 2: Consumers in range (θ1 , θ12 ) have total
f
o
utility U1 = U11
+ U12
.

3. Don’t purchase in period 1, wait and purchase q2 in period 2: Consumers in range (θ2 , θ1 ) have
f
total utility: U2 = U22
.

Second Period. In period 2, the firm sets price p2 to optimally choose θ2 and θ12 to maximize
second period profit across those who upgrade as well as those who buy for the first time:
π2 = (p2 − c)(1 − θ12 ) + (p2 − c)(θ1 − θ2 )
12

A more detailed outline of the analysis is provided in Appendix A.1; the indifference conditions at the thresholds

are specified in Appendix A.1.1.
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No purchase in
either period

θ=0

Purchase only
in period 2

θ2

Purchase only
in period 1

θ1
Figure 2

Purchase in period 1
Upgrade in period 2

θ12

θ=1

Equilibrium segmentation

where 1 − θ12 is the fraction of consumers who upgrade, and θ1 − θ2 is the fraction of consumers
who are first time buyers. Period 2 profit simplifies to:
π2 = (p2 − c)(1 − θ12 + θ1 − θ2 )
First Period. In period 1, the firm sets price p1 to optimally choose θ1 so as to maximize profits
over both periods.
The total firm profit over both periods is given by
Profit = π = π1 + π2 = (p1 − c)(1 − θ1 ) + π2
Without loss of generality, we assume that the marginal cost of the product is 1, and so the margin
per unit sales is p2 − 1. Based on the optimal values of {θ1 , θ2 , θ12 }, we derive the optimal firm
profit.13
Given the consumer and firm choices in equilibrium, we can compute the total environmental
harm, consumer surplus and social surplus as follows.
Environmental Harm = λd (1 − θ12 ) + λu [(1 − θ1 )(1 − e1 )
+ (θ12 − θ1 )(1 − e1 ) + (1 − θ12 )(1 − e2 ) + (θ1 − θ2 )(1 − e2 )]
where 1 − θ12 is the number of discards (units dumped). The unit environmental harm from operating a product (i.e. use cost related harm, or in-use harm) is 1 − ei , which is multiplied by the
number of units using them in periods 1 and 2.
The consumer surplus is given by the following expression:
Z 1
Z θ12
1
1
Consumer Surplus =
(θq1
− p1 ) dθ +
(θδq1
− κλu (1 − e1 )) dθ
1 − e1
1 − e1
θ1
θ1
Z 1
Z θ1
1
1
+
(θq2
− p2 − κ(λu (1 − e2 ) + λd )) dθ +
(θq2
− p2 ) dθ
1 − e2
1 − e2
θ12
θ2
13

The full expressions of optimal prices, quantities, and profits are available in the Appendix A.1.
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The four terms capture (i) first period surplus for consumers who buy in period 1; (ii) second
period surplus for those who do not upgrade; (iii) second period surplus for those who upgrade;
and (iv) second period surplus for those who buy only in the second period.
The social surplus is given by the following expression:
Social Surplus = Firm Profit + Consumer Surplus − Environmental Harm
+κ[λd (1 − θ12 ) + λu (θ12 − θ1 )(1 − e1 ) + λu (1 − θ12 )(1 − e2 )]
For social surplus, we sum up the firm profit, the consumer surplus and subtract out the environmental harm. Finally, we add back the consumers’ internalized environmental harm that was
deducted in the consumer surplus expression.
We next use our modeling framework to study the effect of (i) increasing consumers’ environmental sensitivity (κ) (§4); and (ii) informing consumers about arrival of use efficiency innovations
on equilibrium outcomes (§5).

4.

Consumers’ Environmental Sensitivity

As described in §3.1, consumer’s environmental sensitivity is modeled as κ ∈ [0, 1] where 0 indicates that the consumer perceives no disutility from environmental harm and 1 indicates that
the consumer fully internalizes environmental harm. We now present comparative statics around
environmental sensitivity (κ) on the various market outcomes.
4.1.

Demand Effects

We begin with demand effects—how a change in κ impacts prices and quantities over the two
periods. We summarize the results of the comparative statics in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. Demand Effects
a. Function and fashion innovation: As κ increases,
Period 1: price (p1 ) decreases; quantity (Q1 = 1 − θ1 ) does not change.
Period 2: price (p2 ) decreases; new purchase quantity (Q2 = θ1 − θ2 ) increases; upgrade quantity
(Q12 = 1 − θ12 ) decreases.
b. Use efficiency innovation: As κ increases,
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(c) Use Efficiency Innovation, High λ (Lemma 1b)
Figure 3

Impact of environmental sensitivity on prices & quantities

Period 1: Both price (p1 ) and quantity (Q1 = 1 − θ1 ) decrease.
Period 2:
At lower values of λ: price (p2 ) decreases (when λ < λ∗p2 ); new purchase quantity (Q2 = θ1 − θ2 )
increases; and upgrade quantity (Q12 = 1 − θ12 ) decreases (when λ < λ∗Q12 ).
At higher values of λ: price (p2 ) increases (when λ > λ∗p2 ); new purchase quantity (Q2 = θ1 − θ2 )
increases; and upgrade quantity (Q12 = 1 − θ12 ) increases (when λ > λ∗Q12 ).
The proof for Lemma 1 and the expressions for the λ thresholds are in Appendix A.2.
In Lemma 1, the results for function and fashion innovation as well as use efficiency innovation
when λ values are small are qualitatively similar. So we will discuss these together (graphs for
function innovation and use efficiency innovation are presented in Figure 3). We begin with the
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discussion of the results in period 2. In all of these cases as environmental sensitivity increases,
consumers who bought earlier do not wish to upgrade as they now are concerned more about
dumping cost. With fashion and function innovation, dumping is the main concern. For use efficiency innovation, though the new version has less in-use environmental harm, at lower values of λ,
dumping has greater impact than in-use environmental harm and reduces willingness to upgrade.
This leads to lower upgrade quantity, but also induces firms to lower period-2 price. The lower
period-2 price draws more new customers to purchase in period 2.
The falling price in period 2 for the innovation also depresses the price in period 1. But this
falling price does not increase demand, as this is merely to account for the greater cross-substitution
between the two periods due to the consumer sensitivity for product dumping. Period 1 demand
stays flat for fashion and function innovation, and actually falls for use efficiency innovation, because
customers anticipate a better product in period 2.
Interestingly, however the results are qualitatively different for higher values of λ, where the
in-use environmental harm dominates dumping harm. Here the use efficiency innovation becomes
more valuable as environmental sensitivity increases, leading to more interest in and higher price
for upgrades, but also more purchases in period 2 – both by new buyers as well as those upgrading
from the prior version. Thus increasing environmental sensitivity expands the market only for use
efficiency innovation and that too only when λ is high. As before, in period 1, the price still is lower
and the quantity decreases. This is because in period 1 consumers wait for the period-2 product,
and this induces price reduction.
4.2.

Firm Profit

We next report the comparative statics on firm profit in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Firm Profit
a. Function and fashion innovation: As κ increases, firm profit decreases.
b. Use efficiency innovation: As κ increases, (i) when λ < λ∗π , firm profit decreases; and (ii) when
λ > λ∗π , firm profit increases.
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The expression for the λ threshold and the proof for Proposition 1 is in Appendix A.3.
As before in the discussion of demand effects in §4.1, we group the results in the function and
fashion innovation with the use efficiency innovation result for λ < λ∗π . For fashion and function,
as expected, seller’s profit falls with increasing environmental sensitivity κ of consumers. For use
efficiency, as environmental sensitivity increases, firm profit falls when λ < λ∗π . But in contrast, when
λ > λ∗π , the increasing consumer environmental sensitivity leads to greater demand and willingness
to pay for the newer version, and firm profit rises. We illustrate in Figure 4 the divergent impact
on profits as κ increases for λ above and below the threshold value λ∗π as stated in Proposition 1b.
Total Profit
π

10.6

Higher λ

10.4

Lower λ
10.2

10.0

0.2

Figure 4

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

κ

Use Efficiency Innovation: Impact of environmental sensitivity on firm profit
(when λ < λ∗π vs. when λ > λ∗π ) (Prop. 1b)

For use efficiency innovation, the basic intuition for the result when λ < λ∗π follows from the
demand effects described earlier: increasing consumer sensitivity reduces the incremental value of
the innovation as consumers become more sensitive to the dumping harm of upgrades, and this
reduces prices and profitability overall, even though period-2 purchases by first-time buyers go up.
However, when λ > λ∗π , the incremental value of the innovation increases, encouraging upgrades,
raising prices, and expanding the market.
4.3.

Environmental Harm

We next consider the comparative statics of κ with respect to environmental harm.

Sudhir, Shankar and Jin: Environmental Impact of Durable Goods Innovation

23

Proposition 2. Environmental Harm
a. Function and fashion innovation: As κ increases, (i) dumping harm decreases; (ii) in-use
harm increases; (iii) total harm decreases when λ < λ∗E ; and increases when λ > λ∗E .
b. Use efficiency innovation: As κ increases,
At lower values of λ: (i) dumping harm decreases (when λ < λ∗D ); (ii) in-use harm increases
(when λ < λ∗U ); (iii) total harm decreases.
At higher values of λ: (i) dumping harm increases (when λ > λ∗D ); (ii) in-use harm decreases
(when λ > λ∗U ); (iii) total harm decreases.
The expressions of the λ thresholds and the proof of Proposition 2 are in Appendix A.3.
As before it is useful to group the results in function, fashion, and use efficiency innovation
especially in the case of lower λ values. Figure 5 (a) (i) and (ii) show the changes in in-use,
dumping and total environmental harm for low λ in the function innovation case. Qualitatively,
the comparative statics of κ on environmental harm is similar for the fashion innovation case. Here
as consumers become more environmentally sensitive, the total environmental harm decreases. It
is useful to decompose the environmental harm; in all these cases rising environmental sensitivity
reduces upgrades and therefore dumping harm, but as we noted in demand effects, the demand
expands as second period demand from new buyers increases due to a reduction in prices, and this
demand expansion leads to greater in-use harm. However since the in-use harm relative to dumping
harm is low, the total harm decreases.
In contrast, at higher values of λ, the in-use harm is more significant relative to dumping harm,
and therefore the total harm increases for function and fashion innovation as environmental sensitivity increases—again due to the expansion in the market. The proposition is illustrated in Figure
5 (a) (iii) and (iv). The key (and surprising) insight here is that for fashion and function innovation,
there are conditions when increasing environmental sensitivity among consumers leads to greater
total environmental harm, specifically, when in-use harm dominates. We later assess the sensitivity
of the result to the assumption (motivated by the literature linking guilt and sustainable behaviors) and show that this result is due to the lower environmental harm sensitivity among first time
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buyers, relative to upgraders at the time of purchase. This clarifies the importance of accounting
for behavioral insights in sustainability choices within analytical models.

κ
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4.4.

Consumer and Social Surplus

We next discuss the comparative statics of κ on consumer and social surplus.
Proposition 3. Consumer and Social Surplus
a. Function and fashion innovation: As κ increases, (i) consumer surplus increases when λ <
λ∗CS ; and decreases when λ > λ∗CS ; (ii) social surplus always decreases.
b. Use efficiency innovation: As κ increases, (i) consumer surplus increases when λ < λ∗CS ; and
decreases when λ > λ∗CS ; (ii) social surplus decreases when λ < λ∗SS ; and increases when λ > λ∗SS .
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(b) Use Efficiency Innovation (Proposition 3b)
Figure 6

Impact of environmental sensitivity on consumer and social surplus

Note that unlike typical market settings where the differences in consumer surplus and social
surplus arise primarily from how shares of surplus are allocated between firms and consumers
(beyond the total expansion of surplus), here social surplus should account for environmental harm,
and consumer surplus is also impacted by how much consumers internalize environmental harm
through κ. It is therefore useful to consider an integrative discussion across the various metrics in
discussing consumer and social surplus.
Figure 6 shows the basic results of Proposition 3. A companion figure of how environmental harm,
firm profit, consumer surplus and social surplus change with κ as a function of λ is also provided
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Profit decreases
Environmental harm decreases
Consumer surplus decreases
Social surplus decreases

Profit decreases (with κ)
Environmental harm decreases
Consumer surplus increases
Social surplus decreases

λ∗CS

0

Profit decreases
Environmental harm increases
Consumer surplus decreases
Social surplus decreases

λ

λ∗E

Note: λ∗E is always higher than λ∗CS
(a) Function & fashion innovation
Profit decreases
Environmental harm decreases
Consumer surplus increases
Social surplus decreases

Profit decreases
Environmental harm decreases
Consumer surplus decreases
Social surplus decreases

λ∗CS

0

Profit increases
Environmental harm decreases
Consumer surplus decreases
Social surplus increases

λ∗π & λ∗SS

λ

Notes: Exact values of λ∗π and λ∗SS are not equal but close to each other;
which one is higher depends on the values of parameters e and q1 .
For simplicity, we group the two thresholds together in the figure.
λ∗π and λ∗SS are always higher than λ∗CS .
(b) Use efficiency innovation
Figure 7

Comparing profit, environmental harm and surplus changes with environmental sensitivity

in Figure 7. A complete summary of the comparative statics across the lemmas and propositions
are summarized in Table 3.
Overall, the following key takeaways stand out. For function and fashion innovation, social
surplus always decreases with κ; so the more consumers take into account environmental harm,
the lower the social surplus. Note that there are three regions of λ to consider in Figure 7a. First,
in the region where the use-dump harm ratio is low (λ < λ∗CS ), consumer surplus goes up and total
environmental harm goes down. Note that the consumer surplus increases as a result of the market
expansion in Q2 , but fewer upgrades reduce dumping harm enough to reduce environmental harm.
The fact that despite this the social surplus goes down means that the negative impact on profit
for fashion and function innovations due to increase in κ overwhelms the decrease in environmental
harm and increase in consumer surplus. In the middle range (λ∗CS < λ < λ∗E ), environmental harm
still decreases, but now consumer surplus also decreases. Now social surplus falls because the
decrease in consumer surplus and profits more than overwhelms the decline in environmental harm.
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Innovation Type
Fashion/Function Use Efficiency
Low λ High λ

Low λ High λ

p1

−

−

−

Q1

0

−

−

p2

−

−

+

Q2

+

+

+

Q12

−

−

+

Total Dumping Harm

−

−

+

Total In-use Harm

+

+

−

−

−

−

+

Total Overall Harm

−

+
−

Profit
Consumer Surplus

+

−

+

−

Social Surplus

−

−

−

+

Table 3

Comparative statics with respect to κ

Note: The thresholds that separate “low and high λ” vary across innovation types and metrics.
For exact λ thresholds, please see corresponding propositions.

Finally, in the high λ range (λ > λ∗E ), even the environmental harm increases, thus further increasing
the downward slope of the social surplus.
Next we discuss the case of use-efficiency innovation. Again there are three regions of λ to consider
in Figure 7b. First, in the region where the use-dump harm ratio is low (λ < λ∗CS ), the results
are identical to the case of function and fashion innovation; social surplus goes down, consumer
surplus goes up and total environmental harm goes down. Again the fact that despite the increase
in consumer surplus and decrease in environmental harm, the social surplus goes down implies
that the negative impact on profit for use efficiency innovations with low λ due to increase in κ
overwhelms the decrease in environmental harm and increase in consumer surplus. In the middle
range (λ∗CS < λ < min(λ∗SS , λ∗π )), environmental harm still decreases, but now consumer surplus
also decreases. Now social surplus falls because the decrease in consumer surplus and profits more
than overwhelms the decline in environmental harm. Finally, the key difference is in the high λ
range (λ > max(λ∗SS , λ∗π )), where not only the social surplus increases, but also profit, due to the
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higher price p2 that can be charged for the innovation with an increase in κ. Here consumer surplus
decreases, but environmental harm also decreases.14
4.5.

Who educates consumers on environmental sensitivity?

Our results on how profit and environmental harm changes in response to increasing κ can provide managerial insights on who would take responsibility for sensitizing and educating consumers
about environmental harm. The results are summarized in Table 4. First, we find only one setting,
Innovation Type Low λ
Fashion/Function Profit: Decreases
Env Harm: Decreases
Who Educates: Env Advocate
Use Efficiency
Profit: Decreases
Env Harm: Decreases
Who Educates: Env Advocate
Table 4

High λ
Profit: Decreases
Env Harm: Increases
Who Educates: None
Profit: Increases
Env Harm: Decreases
Who Educates: Firm

Effect of increasing κ; Who educates consumers on environmental sensitivity?

where there is an alignment between firm profit and environmental outcomes. When λ is high,
use efficiency innovation increases firm profit and reduces environmental harm. This alignment
implies that as consumer environmental sensitivity increases, firms will gravitate towards use efficiency innovations in categories where use-dump harm ratio is high. In these categories, firms may
also choose to increase consumer environmental sensitivity as their profits will rise. Examples of
innovations in this group are hybrid and electric cars, air conditioners, heating systems, washing
machines, refrigerators with substantially higher fuel efficiency than prior generation machines.
These categories are clearly high λ categories as they involve significant energy use (and environmental harm) in-use relative to dumping harm. Our analysis suggests that these are categories
where there is high alignment between the producers of such innovation in terms of profits and
environmental benefits, and that such innovators will lead with consumer education. Not surprisingly, manufacturers of hybrid and electric cars may not merely tout the usage efficiency of their
products but be much more heavily embrace the sustainability movement among consumers.
14

For this qualitative discussion of the three regions of λ, we ignore the region λ ∈ (min(λ∗SS , λ∗π ), max(λ∗SS , λ∗π )).
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Second, when the use-dump harm ratio is low, increasing consumer environmental sensitivity
reduces environmental harm and firm profits for all three types of innovations. Therefore in this
setting, firms have little incentive to educate consumers about environmental harm, and environmental advocates have to take the leading in educating consumers to become more sensitive. As
discussed earlier in Table 1, firms marketing fashion and function innovations rarely seek to increase
consumer environmental sensitivity. Even with use-efficiency innovations, for product with low λ,
firms rarely educate consumers directly about being sustainable; much of the advocacy is from
environmental advocacy groups—consistent with our results.
When use-dump harm ratio is large, for fashion/function innovation, there is a lose-lose proposition for firms and the environment as profits fall, and environmental harm increases. In this
condition, neither firms or environmental advocates would seek to increase consumer’s environmental sensitivity. If consumers nevertheless became more environmentally sensitive, then firms
have more incentive to shift away from fashion and function innovations towards use efficiency
innovation. While in our current model, we have treated the innovations as exogenous, our results
suggest that as sensitivity towards environmental harm increases, firms will be nudged to prioritize
use efficiency improvements relative to pure fashion/function innovations. But given that it is often
technically easier to produce fashion/function innovations compared to use-efficiency innovations,
fashion/function innovations will still be introduced more frequently despite higher environmental
sensitivity. Hence our results based on exogenous innovation types remain managerially valuable.
4.6.

Robustness check: Environmental sensitivity among first time buyers

Based on the behavioral literature around guilt and its impact on environmental sensitivity and
sustainable behaviors, we assumed in our main model that only upgraders are sensitive to environmental sensitivity. However, it is possible that even first time buyers may feel some anticipatory
guilt, due to the reactive guilt they feel based on purchases outside the category that create environmental harm. In this section, we therefore relax the assumption of zero environmental sensitivity
among first time buyers and assess the robustness of our result by allowing the sensitivity to environmental harm of first time buyers to be a fraction φ ∈ [0, 1] of the sensitivity of the upgraders.
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Accordingly, we modify the flow utilities of first time buyers in period 1 and 2, from equation (1)
as follows:
f
= θq1
U11

1
1
f
= θq2
− p1 − φκλu (1 − e1 ) and U22
− p2 − φκλu (1 − e2 )
1 − e1
1 − e2

(3)

where pj is the price of product j, and κλu (1 − ej ) reflects the consumer’s environmental disutility
from product usage for a product whose use efficiency is indexed by ej . For owners who purchased
o
in period 1, the period 2 utilities for those who upgrade (U22
) and continue with the same product
o
(U12
) are the same as in equation (2).15

We focus our analysis on function and fashion innovations here to assess the robustness of
our surprising result in Proposition 2(a), where we find that environmental harm increases as κ
increases, when λ > λ∗E . With first time buyers also having some environmental sensitivity, we
obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 4. For function and fashion innovation, as κ increases, there exists a cutoff φ∗E ∈
(0, 1) such that for all φ < φ∗E , total environmental harm increases for a sufficiently large λ > λ∗E ;
for φ > φ∗E , total environmental harm always decreases.
The proof of Proposition 4 and expressions for the λ and φ thresholds for function and fashion
innovations are in Appendix A.3. Proposition 4 shows that as the extent of environmental sensitivity among first time buyers increases, there exists a point at which environmental harm ceases to
increase, and switches to always decreasing with increasing κ. The proposition clarifies the value
of modeling the behavioral insight that first time buyers perceive less environmental harm on equilibrium outcomes. If we had not accounted for the behavioral theory based findings on sustainable
choice, and simply assumed that both first time buyers and upgraders had equal environmental
sensitivity, we would not have identified the insight that increasing environmental sensitivity can
lead to greater environmental harm.
To understand the mechanism of how φ impacts environmental harm, it is useful to understand
how equilibrium prices and quantities change as a function of κ and φ. Not surprisingly as κ
15

Please see Appendix A.1.4 for the relevant indifference equations with φ in the case of function innovation.
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increases, the increase in φ among first time buyers always reduces not only Q1 (the first time
purchases in period 1); but also reduces Q12 (upgrades in period 2). But there is a range φ < φ∗E ,
where as κ increases, this demand suppression leads to a decrease in p2 and an increase in Q2 such
that total sales in the market is higher. At high levels of λ, this leads to higher-in use harm and
higher total environmental harm.

5.

Informing consumers about arrival of use efficiency innovation

Thus far, we have assumed rational expectations about the product launch in the second period;
i.e., forward looking consumers and firms can correctly anticipate period 2 outcomes in period
1, in terms of firm pricing and innovation launch when they make choices. However, consumers
usually do not know when an innovation will be launched unless there is some marketing effort by
some entity (the firm, sustainability advocates or regulator) informing consumers about the future
launch. To the extent that informing consumers in advance (we use “pre-announce” as a shorthand)
about the arrival of time-targeted use-efficiency mandates can impact the timing of consumer
purchases—whether to buy now or wait for the innovation, it will impact not only firm pricing and
equilibrium profit, but also environmental harm. Thus both firms and regulators/sustainability
advocates have an interest in pre-announcements depending on whether it increases profits or
reduce environmental harm. In this section, we investigate how pre-announcements impact profit
and environmental harm; specifically we focus on use efficiency innovations as they produce novel
and useful qualitative insights.
For this analysis, we compare two situations: (a) the firm pre-announces the innovation in period
1, so consumers are aware in period 1 about its arrival in period 2 (as in our analysis thus far);
and (b) there is no pre-announcement in period 1, so consumers are unaware in period 1, and they
simply expect the same product as in period 1 to be available in period 2.16 We then compare the
equilibrium outcomes (firm profit and environmental harm) in the two situations.
16

In their analysis of of product obsolescence of durable goods, Levinthal and Purohit (1989) study the question

of whether a firm should inform consumers of their period 2 product introduction in advance. We follow their
assumption that consumers assign zero probability of a new product arrival in period 2 when they are not informed. As
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5.1.

Demand Effects

We begin by comparing demand effects (prices and quantities) in the pre-announcement and no
announcement cases. The results are summarized in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. For use efficiency innovation,
When λ < λP A∗ : Period 1 price (p1 ) is lower, and period 1 quantity (Q1 = 1 − θ1 ) is higher with
pre-announcement. Though period 2 price (p2 ) is lower with pre-announcement, new purchase quantity (Q2 = θ1 − θ2 ) is lower, but upgrade quantity (Q12 = 1 − θ12 ) is higher with pre-announcement.
When λ > λP A∗ : Period 1 price (p1 ) is lower, but period 1 quantity (Q1 = 1 − θ1 ) is still lower
with pre-announcement. Though period 2 price (p2 ) is higher with pre-announcement, new purchase
quantity (Q2 = θ1 − θ2 ) is still higher, while upgrade quantity (Q12 = 1 − θ12 ) is lower with preannouncement.
5.2.

Firm Profit

We next compare the firm profit in the pre-announcement and no announcement cases.
Proposition 5. For use efficiency innovation,
When λ < λPπ A∗ : firm profit is higher with pre-announcement.
When λ > λPπ A∗ : (i) when κ < κPπ A∗ (λ), firm profit is higher with pre-announcement; (ii) when
κ > κPπ A∗ (λ), firm profit is higher with no announcement. Further, the threshold κPπ A∗ (λ) at which
profits with and without pre-announcement intersects decreases in λ.
The expressions for λ and κ thresholds and proof of Proposition 5 are in Appendix A.3.
Figures 8a and 8b illustrate Proposition 5. We denote profit under pre-announcement as πa and
under no announcement as πu . Figure 8a shows that at low values of λ (λ < λPπ A∗ ), the firm’s profit
is higher with pre-announcement. Figure 8b shows that at high values of λ (λ > λPπ A∗ ), the firm’s
efficiency mandates are relatively uncommon in most appliance categories and consumers have little awareness of such
mandates in the absence of advertising campaigns, this is a reasonable approximation. Going forward, we use “firm
pre-announces” and “consumer is aware” interchangeably; and “firm does not pre-announce,” “no-announcement”
and “consumer is unaware” interchangeably.
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Profit under pre-announcement and no announcement for use efficiency innovation

profit under pre-announcement is lower when environmental sensitivity is above a threshold level
of κPπ A∗ (λ). This threshold point κPπ A∗ (λ) shifts to the left with λ, i.e., decreases with λ.
To understand this result, note that with or without pre-announcement, in period 1, consumers have incentives to postpone buying to period 2, but for different reasons: (i) With preannouncement, consumers wait to avail of the greater use efficiency in the innovation; especially
when environmental sensitivity (κ) exceeds a threshold, they have a greater incentive to wait till
period 2 for the use efficiency innovation. (ii) With no announcement, consumers expect the same
product to be offered in period 2, but now expect a lower future price in period 2 as expected from
the Coase conjecture (Coase 1972). Both of these reasons lead to lower demand (and lower prices)
in period 1. When κ and use-dump harm ratio (λ) are high, consumers have more motivation to
postpone purchase until period 2 when they are aware of the upcoming innovation. But without
the announcement, the firm is able to generate more profit in period 1 compared with the preannouncement case. Further, in period 2, the firm can charge a higher price for the use efficiency
upgrade and still attract highly environmentally aware (high κ) consumers to upgrade, leading to
higher profit without pre-announcement.
However, when the use-dump ratio λ is low, period 1 quantity increases due to the lower period
1 price, as in-use harm is less salient and a low price is effective to induce consumers to buy
the product in period 1. The increase in period 1 purchases leads to a higher profit for the firm
compared with no announcement, and hence the firm would find it optimal to pre-announce the
innovation in period 1, instead of offering the use-efficiency innovation in period 2 as a “surprise.”
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Our result that profit is higher with pre-announcement when λ is low mirrors the result in Levinthal
and Purohit (1989), who do not consider environmental harm (so zero). The finding that profit is
greater without pre-announcement when λ is high is novel.
It is also easy to see why there is an interaction effect between λ and κ in terms of the threshold
at which pre-announcement or no-announcement is optimal. Clearly, use efficiency innovations are
valued more at higher κ. Hence an increase in λ implies a lower κ threshold at which profit without
announcement exceeds the profit with pre-announcement.
5.3.

Environmental Harm

Next, we study the impact of pre-announcing the use efficiency innovation on environmental harm.
Proposition 6. For use efficiency innovation, when λ < λP A∗ : dumping harm, in-use harm and
total harm are higher when there is pre-announcement; when λ > λP A∗ : dumping harm, in-use
harm and total harm are higher when there is no announcement.
The expression for the λ threshold and proof for Proposition 6 are in Appendix A.3.
As discussed earlier, pre-announcements make consumers’ intertemporal substitution elasticities
greater. When the use-dump harm ratio λ is low, consumers are more focused on the dumping
harm at replacement. The firm reduces prices to induce upgrades in period 2 (Q12 increases), which
at the same time increases the overall quantities sold across the two periods, leading to greater
overall environmental harm. But when in-use harm is large, the focus is not just on lower cost of
use, but also on the reduced environmental harm; and getting consumers to focus on the benefits
of the innovation (lower use cost and greater reduction in environmental harm) leads to overall
better alignment with environmental outcomes when there is pre-announcement and consumers
become aware of the future use efficiency innovation in period 1.
5.4.

Consumer and Social Surplus

Proposition 7. For use efficiency innovation, consumer surplus and social surplus are always
higher with pre-announcement.
The proof for Proposition 7 is provided in Appendix A.3.
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Low λ
High λ
Lower κ Profit: Higher
Profit: Higher
Env Harm: Higher
Env Harm: Lower
Who Pre-announces: Firm Who Pre-announces: Firm
Higher κ Profit: Higher
Profit: Lower
Env Harm: Higher
Env Harm: Lower
Who Pre-announces: Firm Who Pre-announces: Env Advocate
Table 5

Effect of pre-announcing use efficiency innovation; Who pre-announces?

As consumer and social surplus always increase with pre-announcements, consumer (not sustainability) advocates and regulators would always prefer to provide advance information about
the arrival of use efficiency innovations through advertising and/or public relations in the media,
even if firms are reluctant to do so given profit considerations.
5.5.

Who pre-announces (educates) about arrival of use efficiency innovation?

We jointly consider the results in Propositions 5-7 to gain insight on who should educate consumers through pre-announcements of use-efficient innovation. Table 5 summarizes the effects of
pre-announcements on profit and environmental harm. As consumer surplus and social surplus
unambiguously favor pre-announcements, they are not included in the table.
We begin with the two low λ cases. Firm profit is higher with pre-announcement, but environmental harm is also higher. While environmental advocates will therefore prefer not to pre-announce,
firms will pre-announce it due to higher profit. But consumer and social surplus are also greater
with pre-announcement. Overall, however recall from the analysis reported in Table 4, that the
use-efficiency innovation itself does reduce environmental harm even with pre-announcement.
But firms will not always pre-announce in the high λ cases. When κ is low, firm profit and environmental harm are aligned and the firm will indeed make pre-announcement and the environmental
harm will be lower. But when κ is high, we have misalignment. The firm will not pre-announce
as it reduces profit though there is an environmental benefit. But an environmental advocate can
pre-announce and ensure the full benefit of reduced environmental harm is attained.
Overall our analysis sheds managerial insight on when firms or environmental advocates should
take responsibility for consumer education about the arrival of time-mandated use efficiency innovations. Further, the set of results in the high λ case also go against conventional wisdom that
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consumer environmental sensitivity through education is a substitute for regulatory intervention
or environmental advocacy. Here, when consumer environmental sensitivity is low, firms make the
environmentally aligned pre-announcement choice; but it is when the environmental sensitivity is
high that the misalignment of profit incentives requires an environmental advocate to step in.

6.

Conclusion

In this paper, we develop an economic modeling framework to understand how sustainability interventions impact firm profit and environmental harm in durable goods markets. We make three
contributions in terms of modeling to the literature: First, we build on the behavioral literature on
how reactive and anticipatory guilt impact sustainability choices; one implication of this literature
for modeling is that consumers who own a product in the category already are more sensitive to
environmental harm. Second, we disentangle environmental harm over the life cycle arising from
product use and dumping the product at replacement; we clarify that the relative ratio of in-use
and dumping harm play a crucial role in both understanding equilibrium outcomes and the effectiveness of different sustainability interventions. Finally, we introduce a taxonomy of innovations
(function, fashion and use-efficiency) that differ in how they provide incremental consumer value
and cause environmental harm; we show that use-efficiency innovations differ from fashion and
function innovation in terms of many key results.
We capture the dynamics of market outcomes in a two period model where consumers and firms
are forward looking. Consumers choose whether and when to buy accounting not only for flow
utility and use cost but also environmental impact. Firms set prices in response to these consumer
choices. We thus assess how equilibrium consumer choice, firm profit and environmental impact
are affected in equilibrium for different innovation types.
We then consider the effect on firm profit and environmental harm from increasing consumer
green sensitivity through education, first in the context of rational expectations for fashion, function
and use-efficiency innovation, and then allowing for unexpected introduction of use efficiency innovation. We find conditions where counter-intuitively, (i) increasing green sensitivity can increase
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environmental harm for fashion and function innovation, and (ii) pre-announcement of use efficiency
innovations can hurt firm profits and increase environmental harm.
Overall, decomposing the environmental harm in terms of in-use harm and dumping harm turns
out to be conceptually meaningful in the study of sustainable innovations, where consumers consider
the tradeoff between dumping harm and in-use harm as they adopt and upgrade in durable goods
markets. Further, with use efficiency innovation, there are situations when higher environmental
awareness among consumers requires complementary regulatory support to protect the environment, which goes against the conventional wisdom that environmental awareness and regulatory
action are substitutes. In general, our analysis provides insight on when there are win-win policies
for both the firm and the environment, and when advocates/regulators need to be adversarial with
firms to achieve desired sustainability goals.
6.1.

Limitations and Future Research

We now discuss certain abstractions and limitations in our model that can be extended in future
research. The analysis in the paper is based a two-period model with a static set of consumers; it
would be useful to extend and assess the sensitivity to an infinite horizon model with overlapping
generations of consumers.17 Further, we abstracted away from the potential presence of of secondhand markets. In some categories, these can significantly impact for dumping harm, in-use harm,
and market prices and quantities. Also, the paper considered a durable goods monopoly; it would be
useful to extend the analysis to competitive settings to assess robustness and potential differences
in insights. Further, we considered profit maximizing firms, whose choices are governed only by
their effects on demand and profit. With firms increasingly incorporate sustainability goals into
their own objectives, it would be promising to study the resulting equilibria in future research.
17

We note that the surprising result that environmental harm can be greater with rising κ will not be overturned by

the presence of new consumers in period 2. This is because κ always suppresses period 2 prices (even if only a little if
there are new consumers), and this price decrease will always increase Q2 whether it is only from the residual demand
of non-purchasers from the first period or includes new consumers from the second period. Thus the intuition for
increase in environmental harm due to increase in Q2 remains. We thank a reviewer for suggesting this discussion.
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Our modeling framework is rich can be used and extended to study various demand and supply
side sustainability interventions. As an example of demand side interventions, one could study how
to structure sustainability taxes. For example, should it be a fixed fee per unit, percentage of price,
or a multiple on estimated environmental harm? When should it be charged: at purchase or at
disposal? On the supply side, one can evaluate the impact of sustainable design and manufacturing
policies (e.g., modular upgrades, recyclable/biodegradable inputs) that impact market outcomes
through their effect on environmental harm and thus consumer choices. One could study the effect
of firm-side taxes based on environmental harm and its downstream pass-through effects not only
on pricing, but also in the choice of production technology that minimizes environmental harm
(e.g., modular production, firm recycling programs).
Finally, our analysis treated fashion, function and use efficiency innovations as distinct types of
innovations, and product and upgrade characteristics as exogenous. This helped us isolate results
associated with each type of innovation. We note however that typically, there are fewer technology
constraints for fashion and function innovations than for use efficiency innovations; so fashion and
function innovations tend to be more frequent than use efficiency innovations. The fact that our
key insights are similar for fashion and function, but differ for use-efficiency innovations is therefore
managerially useful.18 Nevertheless future work should consider innovations as a combination of
these types, with characteristics that are endogenously chosen by firms. This would require adding
a cost structure including marginal and fixed costs, and environmental harm arising from the use of
different technologies to characterize the optimal choice of production/recycling methods. Overall,
we hope our modeling framework accounting for consumer guilt in sustainable choice serves as a
starting point for a rich agenda addressing sustainability issues in studying durable goods markets.
18

In the current paper, we did not focus on differences between fashion versus function innovations. This needs

analysis on factors unique to fashion and function innovations—e.g., fashion depreciation or functional improvements.
As an illustration, we report analysis of comparative statics on fashion depreciation δ in online appendix §EC.2.1.
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Appendix A:

Results and Proofs

In this appendix (including all solutions, proofs, and other discussions), for simplification, we use q1 to
uniformly represent the quality q11 in period 1 regarding all 3 innovation cases, and q2 to represent the
quality q22 in period 2 for function innovation. For use efficiency innovation, since q22 = q11 , in period 2, we
still use q1 to indicate the quality. For fashion innovation, the perceived quality of the product bought in
period 1 has depreciated to δq1 in period 2.
A.1.

Main Model

A.1.1.

Function innovation

We proceed to solve period 2 optimal θ values first, and then period 1’s

by backward induction. In period 2, the threshold consumer θ12 is indifferent between (a) upgrading to q2
at price p2 , and experiencing environmental disutility from dumping (κ) and usage (κλ), and (b) continuing
to use q1 at no extra expense, and incurring just the usage based environmental disutility (κλ). This is
captured in the following condition: θ12 q2 − p2 − κ(1 + λ) = θ12 q1 − κλ. Solving the condition for p2 yields:
p2 = θ12 (q2 − q1 ) − κ.
In period 2, the threshold consumer θ2 is indifferent between (a) buying q2 at price p2 , and experiencing
no environmental disutility (since guilt requires prior purchase and this consumer has not yet purchased
the good), and (b) buying nothing, captured by the condition: q2 θ2 − p2 = 0. Solving this condition, we
obtain another expression for p2 : p2 = q2 θ2 . Equating the two expressions for p2 above, and solving for θ12
yields: θ12 =

κ+θ2 q2
q2 −q1

. We then substitute the above value for θ12 in the second period profit expressions:

π2 = (θ1 − θ2 ) (p2 − 1) and π12 = (1 − θ12 ) (p2 − 1). And we solve the first order condition

∂ (π2 +π12 )
∂θ2

= 0 for

the optimal value of θ1 in terms of θ2 and other parameters, to obtain the following expression for θ2 :
θ2 =

2
2
θ1 q2
−θ1 q1 q2 −κq2 +q2
−q1 q2 +2q2 −q1
2q2 (2q2 −q1 )

.

We now turn to period 1, where the threshold consumer θ1 is indifferent between (a) buying q1 in period 1
at price p1 , and using it for two periods, and (b) waiting and buying q2 at period 2 at price p2 , and using it
for one period. In either alternative, this consumer feels no environmental disutility in period 1, because they
have not yet consumed the product at the time of formulating this equation (and hence have not experienced
guilt), and moreover, in period 2 the two product-alternatives q1 and q2 have identical usage efficiencies. This
is captured in the following indifference condition: 2q1 θ1 − p1 = q2 θ1 − p2 . Substituting for p2 and solving for
p1 , we have: p1 =

4θ1 q12 −9θ1 q2 q1 +3θ1 q22 +κq2 +q2 q1 +q1 −q22 −2q2
.
2(q1 −2q2 )
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Substituting for p2 in the expression for period-1 profit π1 = (p1 − 1)(1 − θ1 ), and solving the first order
∂ (π1 +π2 +π12 )
∂θ1

condition

= 0, we obtain the optimal value for θ1 : θ1 =

4q12 −9q2 q1 +3q22
.
8q12 −19q2 q1 +7q22

Substituting for the above

value for θ1 into the expressions for θ2 and θ12 , gives us the following segmentation boundaries:


κ+q1 )
1
1 (−3q1 +q2 )
5 + 7(
θ2 = 14
+ q72 + 8q42q−
2
q1 −2q2
19
q
q
+7
q
1
2
1
2


7(κ+q1 )
2q1 (8q1 −5q2 )
7(1+κ)
1
θ12 = 14 5 − q1 −2q2 + −q1 +q2 + 8q2 −19q1 q2 +7q2
1

2

Substituting for these expressions in the profit and pricing expressions, gives the optimal solutions.
Endogenous segmentation boundaries are interior points:
It remains to be shown that 0 < θ2 < θ1 < θ12 < 1. The inequality translates to:
0<

1
14




k+q1 )
4q1 (−3q1 +q2 )
7
5 + 7(
+
+
<
2
2
q1 −2q2
q2
8q −19q1 q2 +7q
1

2

4q12 −9q1 q2 +3q22
8q12 −19q1 q2 +7q22

<

1
14




k+q1 )
2q1 (8q1 −5q2 )
7(1+k)
5 − 7(
+
+
<1
2
2
q1 −2q2
−q1 +q2
8q −19q1 q2 +7q
1

2

It can be verified algebraically that the above inequality is valid in the parameter range when 0 < q1 < q2 <
3
q ,
2 1

q1 > 1, and q12 (35+62κ+74q1 )q2 +(14+21κ+80q1 )q23 > 8q13 (1+2κ+2q1 )+q1 (45+71κ+120q1 )q22 +18q24 .

The last condition can be interpreted as: the ratio q2 /q1 (which measures the degree of innovation) should
be above a threshold specified by q1 . In other words, for a parameter range where we witness at least
some meaningful innovation that has a floor (i.e. q2 /q1 being above a threshold) and at most a realistically
large extent of innovation that has a ceiling bound (i.e. 23 q1 > q2 ), we see that all the endogenously derived
segmentation boundaries preserve their relative order and are bounded between 0 and 1.
The full expressions of the optimal solutions are:
π=

1
(−196 − 98κ + 51q1
196

2

2

4q 2 (4q +q )

κ+q1 )
κ)
2
)
+ 49(
+ 49
+ 42q2 + 49(1+
− 8q2 −119q11q2 +7
q1 −2q2
q2
−q1 +q2
q2
1

2

p1 =

16q14 +q13 (8−64q2 )+q1 (45−19κ−28q2 )q22 +q23 (−14+7κ+2q2 )+q12 q2 (−35+8κ+78q2 )
2(q1 −2q2 )(8q12 −19q1 q2 +7q22 )

p2 =

2
q1
(−35+8κ−40q2 )q2 +(−14+7κ−10q2 )q23 +4q13 (2+3q2 )+q1 q22 (45−19κ+38q2 )
2(q1 −2q2 )(8q12 −19q1 q2 +7q22 )

Q1 =

4q12 −10q1 q2 +4q22
8q12 −19q1 q2 +7q22

Q2 =

(14−7κ−2q2 )q23 −4q13 (2+q2 )+q1 q22 (−45+19κ+4q2 )+q12 q2 (35−8κ+6q2 )
2(q1 −2q2 )q2 (8q12 −19q1 q2 +7q22 )

Q12 =

16q14 +2q13 (4+8κ−37q2 )+q1 (45+71κ−80q2 )q22 +q23 (−7(2+3κ)+18q2 )+q12 q2 (−35−62κ+120q2 )
2(q1 −2q2 )(q1 −q2 )(8q12 −19q1 q2 +7q22 )

harm =
A.1.2.

λ)(κ+q1 )
1
(9 + 17λ − 7(−1+
14
q1 −2q2

κ)
4+λ)q1 +(5+4λ)q2 )
+ 7(1+
− 7q2λ + 2q1 (2(8−
)
q1 −q2
q 2 −19q1 q2 +7q 2
1

2

Fashion innovation In this case, the analysis and results are essentially similar to the function

case. The difference is that, while in the function case, the period-2 quality is q2 as opposed to a period-1
quality of q1 , in the case of fashion innovation, the period-2 quality remains q1 , while the period-1 quality
in period 2 degenerates to δq1 , where 0 < δ < 1.
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The indifference equations are now: θ12 q1 − p2 − κ(λ + 1) = δθ12 q1 − κλ, θ2 q1 − p2 = 0, and (1 + δ)q1 θ1 −
p1 = q1 θ1 − p2 . To show that endogenous segmentation boundaries are interior points, it remains to be
shown that 0 < θ2 < θ1 < θ12 < 1. The inequality translates to: 0 <
2((δ−2)δ(3δ−2)+1)
−2δκ−δ+3κ+2
−
q1
δ(4δ−7)−1

2(δ−2)(δ−1)

2(δ−2)δ(3δ−2)+2
+ δ+κ−2
q1
δ(4δ−7)−1

2(δ−2)

<

(3−2δ )δ +1
(7−4δ )δ +1

<

< 1. It can be verified algebraically that this inequality is valid in the parameter

range when 0.6 < δ < 1 and q1 >

−2−13δ +15δ 2 −4δ 3 −3κ−19δκ+26δ 2 κ−8δ 3 κ
−2−14δ +40δ 2 −32δ 3 +8δ 4

. Similar to the function innovation, the

last condition can be interpreted as an upper bound for the value of δ determined by the value of q1 , showing
that the feasible parameter range requires at least some meaningful innovation. At the same time, δ > 0.6
shows the lower bound for δ. In this specified parameter range, we see that all the endogenously derived
segmentation boundaries preserve their relative order and are bounded between 0 and 1.
Using the same procedure as before, we derive the following optimal expressions:
π=

(−1−7δ +4δ 2 )(2−δ +κ)2 −4(1+6δ−11δ 2 +4δ 3 )(−2+δ−κ)q1 +4(−1−5δ +13δ 2 −7δ 3 −δ 4 +δ 5 )q12
4(−2+δ )(−1+δ )(−1−7δ +4δ 2 )q1

p1 =
p2 =
Q1 =

−2+δ +κ+

2(1+6δ−3δ 2 −4δ 3 +2δ 4 )q1
−1−7δ+4δ 2

−2+δ +κ+

2(1+4δ−8δ 2 +3δ 3 )q1
−1−7δ+4δ 2

2(−2+δ )

2(−2+δ )
2(−2+δ )δ
−1−7δ +4δ 2

Q2 =
Q12 =

2(1+δ+δ 2 −δ 3 )
− −2+δ+κ
q1
−1−7δ+4δ 2

2(−2+δ )
2+14δ−40δ 2 +32δ 3 −8δ 4
1+7δ−4δ 2

harm =
A.1.3.

+ −2+δ−3κ+2δκ
q
1

2(−2+δ )(−1+δ )
2 λ−2(1+λ)
2(1+λ+δ 3 (4+3λ)−3δ 2 (4+5λ)+δ(8+17λ))
+ δ+κ(−3+λ)−δκ(−2+λ)+3δλ−δ
(−1+δ)q1
−1−7δ+4δ 2

2(−2+δ )

Use efficiency innovation

In this case, we have the use efficiency term ei , which is normalized

to e1 = 0 in period 1, and e2 = e in period 2. The intrinsic quality remains q1 over both periods.
1
1
The indifference equations are now: θ12 1q−e
− p2 − κ(λ(1 − e) + 1) = θ12 q1 − κλ, θ2 1q−e
− p2 = 0, and

2q1 θ1 − p1 =

q1

θ
1−e 1

− p2 + κλe. The reasoning for the indifference equations above is largely similar to that

for function innovation in section A.1.1, with the exception that (i) in the first equation, on the left side,
the usage based environmental disutility has a (1 − e) term (i.e. it is κλ(1 − e)) to account for the increased
efficiency of the upgrade – which consequently leads to a lower environmental disutility for the consumer; (ii)
the q2 expression is replaced by

q1

1−e

to account for the increased intrinsic value of q2 arising from increased

use efficiency; and (iii) for the threshold period-1 buyer θ1 , who may buy in period 1 and enjoy the product
q1 for two periods (hence 2q1 θ1 − p1 on the left side of the equation), on the right side of the equation we
add κλe (= κλ − κλ(1 − e)), the net environmental utility from consuming a more energy efficient product
if they choose to wait and buy in period 2. The obvious period-2 environmental benefit of consuming the
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relatively more usage-efficient upgrade in period 2 with a lower disutility κλ(1 − e) (compared to the higher
disutility κλ of the original version available for purchase in period 1) causes the forward-looking consumer
to factor in this benefit in their period-1 indifference equation.
Endogenous segmentation boundaries are interior points:
It remains to be shown that 0 < θ2 < θ1 < θ12 < 1. The inequality translates to:
0<

It
ter

(e − 1) ((4 − e(8e + 3))(e − κ + 1) − e (6e2 + e − 4) κλ) + 2e (6e2 + 2e − 3) q1
2(e + 1)(e(8e + 3) − 4)q1

<

2e (e2 − 1) κλ + (4e2 + e − 2) q1
(e(8e + 3) − 4)q1

<

2e (6e2 + 2e − 3) q1 + (e − 1)(e(e(16e(e + 1) − 3) − 4)κλ + (4 − e(8e + 3))(2eκ + e + κ + 1))
<1
2e(e + 1)(e(8e + 3) − 4)q1

can
range

be

verified

when

algebraically

0 < e < 0.3,

that

q1 >

the

above

inequality

is

valid

−4+3e+12e2 −3e3 −8e4 −4κ−eκ+19e2 κ+2e3 κ−16.e4 κ
−2.e−6.e2 +10.e3 +16.e4

4−3e−12e2 +3e3 +8e4 +4κ+eκ−19e2 κ−2e3 κ+16e4 κ+2eq1 −6e2 q1 −2e3 q1 +8e4 q1
.
4eκ+3e2 κ−15e3 κ−4e4 κ+12e5 κ

in
,

the
and

parame0 < λ <

Similar to the function and fashion innova-

tion’s boundary conditions, the conditions for the use efficiency innovation can also be interpreted as that
we have both upper and lower bounds for the innovation degree (that is, e). Additionally, the value of λ
cannot be very large. In the parameter range specified by the conditions above, all the endogenously derived
segmentation boundaries preserve their relative order and are bounded between 0 and 1. We therefore derive
the following optimal solutions:
π=

1
((−1 + e)2 (4(1 + κ)2
4(−1+e)e(1+e)(−4+3e+8e2 )q1

+ 4e5 κ2 λ2 + 8e4 (−1 + 2κλ) − e(1 + κ)(−5 + κ(3 + 8λ)) +

e3 (−19 + κ2 λ(16 + λ) + 2κ(−8 + 11λ)) + 2e2 (−5 − κ(11 + λ) + κ2 (−4 + 3λ + 2λ2 ))) − 4(−1 + e)e(−4(1 + κ) +
e2 (11 + κ(8 − 3λ)) + 4e4 κλ + e3 (8 − 2κλ) + e(−1 + κ(3 + 2λ)))q1 + 4e(1 + 2e − 6e2 − 4e3 + 4e4 )q12 )
p1 =

−(−1+e)(4+e−4κ+3eκ+8e4 κλ+e2 (−11+8κ−3κλ)+4e3 (−2+κλ))+2(2−9e2 +8e4 )q1
2(−1+e)(1+e)(−4+3e+8e2 )

p2 =

(−1+e)((−4+e(3+8e))(1+e−κ)+e(−4+e+6e2 )κλ)−2e(−3+2e+6e2 )q1
2(−1+e)(1+e)(−4+3e+8e2 )

1+e)eκλ+(1−2e)q1 )
Q1 = − 2(1+e)(((−−4+3
e+8e2 )q1

Q2 =

(−1+e)((−4+e(3+8e))(1+e−κ)+e2 (9+10e)κλ)+(−4+2e(2+(3−2e)e))q1
2(1+e)(−4+3e+8e2 )q1

Q12 =

(−1+e)((−4+e(3+8e))(1+e+κ+2eκ)+e(4+e(3−16e(1+e)))κλ)+2e(−1+e(1+e)(−3+8e))q1
2e(1+e)(−4+3e+8e2 )q1

harm =

1
((−1
2e(1+e)(−4+3e+8e2 )q1

+ e)(−4(1 + κ) + 2e5 λ(−4 + 3κλ) + e4 λ(−11 + 3κ(−8 + 3λ)) + e(−1 +

κ(−5 + 12λ)) + e2 (11 + 4λ + κ(14 + λ − 12λ2 )) + e3 (8 + λ + κ(16 − 35λ − 10λ2 ))) − 2e(1 + e(3 − 5λ) + 2e3 (−4 +
λ) + 6λ + 6e4 λ − e2 (5 + 16λ))q1 )

48

Sudhir, Shankar and Jin: Environmental Impact of Durable Goods Innovation

A.1.4.

Robustness check: Environmental sensitivity among first time buyers

Since it is possible

that even first time buyers may feel anticipatory guilt, we therefore relax the assumption of zero environmental sensitivity among first time buyers and assess the robustness of our result by allowing the sensitivity
to environmental harm of first time buyers to be a fraction φ ∈ [0, 1] of the sensitivity of the upgraders. We
now formulate the extent of anticipatory guilt as φ ∗ κ. Using function innovation as an example, we show
the revised indifference equations as follows: θ12 q2 − p2 − κ(λ + 1) = θ12 q1 − κλ, θ2 q2 − p2 − φκλ = 0, and
2θ1 q1 − p1 − 2φκλ = θ1 q2 − p2 − φκλ.
In the first equation above, in period 2 the θ12 buyer – if they upgrade (left side of equation) – feels
environmental disutility due to guilt from dumping plus usage based harm: κ(λ + 1); whereas if they don’t
upgrade (right side of equation), they feel the usage based harm alone (κλ). The φ term is not involved here
because the buyer does feel guilt from previous usage, and so feels the full environmental disutility. In the
second equation, the new buyer θ2 feels environmental disutility from usage (φκλ) if they buy, and none if
they don’t. In the third equation, the buyer feels environmental disutility amounting to (a) φκλ for period
1 and another φκλ for period 2 on the left side of the equation, and (b) φκλ for only period 2 on the right
side. The φ term is involved in environmental disutility when the buyer, when formulating the indifference
equations, has not yet consumed the product and so feels anticipatory guilt (hence φκλ). Setting φ = 1 gives
us the indifference equations of the case where anticipatory guilt is as strong as reactive guilt.
The optimal solutions in this robustness analysis (function and fashion innovation cases) and proof for
Proposition 4 are provided in Appendix A.3.
A.2.

Proofs of Lemmas

Proof of Lemma 1
In the function innovation case, we take partial derivatives of the optimal prices and quantities with respect
to κ, and find that over the entire feasible range of parameter space of interest,19 all of the following hold:
∂ p1
∂ κ

=

q2

2q1 −4q2

< 0;

∂ p2
∂ κ

=

q2

2q1 −4q2

< 0;

∂ Q1
∂ κ

= 0;

∂ Q2
∂ κ

=

1
4q2 −2q1

> 0; and

∂ Q12
∂ κ

=

1
2q1 −4q2

+ 2q1 −1 2q2 < 0.

Similarly, in the fashion innovation case, we take partial derivatives of the optimal prices and quantities
with respect to κ, and find that over the entire feasible range of parameter space of interest, all of the following
hold:
19

∂ p1
∂ κ

=

1
2(−2+δ )

< 0;

∂ p2
∂ κ

=

1
2(−2+δ )

< 0;

∂ Q1
∂ κ

= 0;

∂ Q2
∂ κ

=

1
4q1 −2δq1

> 0; and ∂ ∂Qκ12 =

Details of feasible range of parameters can be found in the proof for Proposition 1.

−3+2δ
2(2−3δ +δ 2 )q1

< 0.
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In the use efficiency innovation case, we take partial derivatives of the optimal prices and quantities
with respect to κ. Over the entire feasible range of parameter space of interest, all of the following hold:
∂ p1
∂ κ

=

4−e(3+8e+e(−3+4e+8e2 )λ)
2(1+e)(−4+e(3+8e))

If λ > λ∗p2 =

−4+3e+8e2
−4e+e2 +6e3

If λ > λ∗Q12 =
λ < λ∗Q12 , then

< 0;

, then

∂ p2
∂ κ

−4−5e+14e2 +16e3
−4e−3e2 +16e3 +16e4

∂ Q12
∂ κ

∂ Q1
∂ κ

=

2

e(−1+e )λ
< 0;
= − (−24+
e(3+8e))q1

4+e(−3−4λ+e(−8+λ+6eλ))
2(1+e)(−4+e(3+8e))

, then

∂ Q12
∂ κ

=

∂ Q2
∂ κ

=

(−1+e)(4+e(−3−8e+e(9+10e)λ))
2(1+e)(−4+e(3+8e))q1

> 0.

∂ p2
∂ κ

< 0.

> 0; otherwise, if λ < λ∗p2 , then

4+e(1−4λ+e(−19+λ+e(−2+19λ−16e(−1+eλ))))
2e(1+e)(−4+e(3+8e))q1

> 0; otherwise, if

< 0.

Proof of Lemma 2
The consumer type condition 1 > θ12 > θ1 > θ2 > 0 holds in the use efficiency innovation case when 0 < e < 0.3, q1 >

−4+3e+12e2 −3e3 −8e4 −4κ−eκ+19e2 κ+2e3 κ−16.e4 κ
−2.e−6.e2 +10.e3 +16.e4

, and 0 < λ <

4−3e−12e2 +3e3 +8e4 +4κ+eκ−19e2 κ−2e3 κ+16e4 κ+2eq1 −6e2 q1 −2e3 q1 +8e4 q1
.
4eκ+3e2 κ−15e3 κ−4e4 κ+12e5 κ

Over the entire feasible range of parameter space of interest, p1aware < p2unaware always holds.
Given that λ < λP A∗ =

4κ−7eκ−5e2 κ+8e3 κ+4q1 −4eq1 −10e2 q1
,
4κ+5eκ−11e2 κ−6e3 κ+8e4 κ

all of the following hold: Q1aware > Q1unaware ,

p2aware < p2unaware , Q2aware < Q2unaware , Q12aware > Q12unaware .
Given that λ > λP A∗ , all of the following hold: Q1aware < Q1unaware , p2aware > p2unaware , Q2aware >
Q2unaware , Q12aware < Q12unaware .
A.3.

Proofs of Propositions

Proof of Proposition 1
Function innovation: We verify algebraically that

∂ π
∂ κ

= 12 (−1 +

κ+q1
q1 −2q2

+

1+κ
−q1 +q2

) < 0 always holds over

the entire feasible range of parameter space of interest. Based on our model, the consumer type condition
1 > θ12 > θ1 > θ2 > 0 must hold to yield feasible market quantities. In the function innovation case, this
condition holds when 0 < q1 < q2 < 1.5q1 , q1 > 1, and q12 (35 + 62κ + 74q1 )q2 + (14 + 21κ + 80q1 )q23 > 8q13 (1 +
2κ + 2q1 ) + q1 (45 + 71κ + 120q1 )q22 + 18q24 . The last condition can be interpreted as: the ratio q2 /q1 (i.e., the
innovation degree) should be above a threshold specified by the value of q1 .
Fashion innovation: We verify algebraically that

∂ π
∂ κ

=

2−δ+κ
2+ (−1+δ)q

2(−2+δ )

1

< 0 always holds over the entire feasible

range of parameter space of interest. The consumer type condition 1 > θ12 > θ1 > θ2 > 0 holds in the fashion
upgrade case when 0.6 < δ < 1 and q1 >
Use efficiency innovation:

∂ π
∂ κ

−2−13δ +15δ 2 −4δ 3 −3κ−19δκ+26δ 2 κ−8δ 3 κ
−2−14δ +40δ 2 −32δ 3 +8δ 4

.

= ((−1 + e)(−(−4 + e(3 + 8e))(1 + e + κ) + e(−4 + e(3 + 8e))(1 + e + 2κ)λ +

e2 (4 + e + 4e3 )κλ2 ) − 2e(−4 + e(3 + 8e + (2 + e(−3 − 2e + 4e2 ))λ))q1 )/(2e(1 + e)(−4 + e(3 + 8e))q1 ) < 0
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holds over the feasible range of parameters when λ < λ∗π =

1
(−4e
2(−4e2 κ+3e3 κ+e4 κ−4e5 κ+4e6 κ)

+ 3e2 + 12e3 −

3e4 − 8e5 − 8eκ + 14e2 κ + 10e3 κ − 16e4 κ + 4e2 q1 − 6e3 q1 − 4e4 q1 + 8e5 q1 − (−4(−4e2 κ + 3e3 κ + e4 κ − 4e5 κ +
4e6 κ)(−4 + 3e + 12e2 − 3e3 − 8e4 − 4κ + 7eκ + 5e2 κ − 8e3 κ + 8eq1 − 6e2 q1 − 16e3 q1 ) + (4e − 3e2 − 12e3 + 3e4 +
8e5 + 8eκ − 14e2 κ − 10e3 κ + 16e4 κ − 4e2 q1 + 6e3 q1 + 4e4 q1 − 8e5 q1 )2 )1/2 ); and

∂ π
∂ κ

> 0 holds when λ > λ∗π .

The consumer type condition 1 > θ12 > θ1 > θ2 > 0 holds in the use efficiency innovation case when 0 < e < 0.3, q1 >

−4+3e+12e2 −3e3 −8e4 −4κ−eκ+19e2 κ+2e3 κ−16.e4 κ
−2.e−6.e2 +10.e3 +16.e4

, and 0 < λ <

4−3e−12e2 +3e3 +8e4 +4κ+eκ−19e2 κ−2e3 κ+16e4 κ+2eq1 −6e2 q1 −2e3 q1 +8e4 q1
.
4eκ+3e2 κ−15e3 κ−4e4 κ+12e5 κ

Proof of Proposition 2
We take partial derivatives of the total environmental harm harm, the dumping harm dumping, and the
in-use harm usage, with respect to environmental sensitivity κ.
Function innovation: Over the entire feasible range of parameters of interest,
holds when λ < λ∗E =
holds.

∂ usage
∂ κ

=

3q2 −2q1
q2 −q1

λ

; and

∂ harm
∂ κ

> 0 holds when λ > λ∗E .

∂ dumping
∂ κ

λ

4q1 −2δq1

3−2δ
;
1−δ

=

1
= 12 ( q11−−λ
+ q1 −q
)<0
2q2
2

1
2q1 −4q2

+

1
2q1 −2q2

< 0 always

> 0 always holds.

4q2 −2q1

Fashion innovation: Over the entire feasible range of parameters of interest,
when λ < λ∗E =

∂ harm
∂ κ

and

∂ harm
∂ κ

> 0 holds when λ > λ∗E .

∂ dumping
∂ κ

=

∂ harm
∂ κ

−3+2δ
2(2−3δ +δ 2 )q1

=

−3+2δ +λ−δλ
2(2−3δ +δ 2 )q1

< 0 always holds.

< 0 holds
∂ usage
∂ κ

=

> 0 always holds.

Use efficiency innovation: Over the entire feasible range of parameters of interest,
(−1+e)(−4+e(−5+12λ+e(14+16e+λ−e(35+24e)λ+(−12+e(−10+9e+6e2 ))λ2 )))
2e(1+e)(−4+e(3+8e))q1
4+e(1−4λ+e(−19+λ+e(−2+19λ−16e(−1+eλ))))
2e(1+e)(−4+e(3+8e))q1

holds when λ < λ∗D .
−8+2e+19e2 +8e3
e(−12−10e+9e2 +6e3 )

∂ usage
∂ κ

; and

=

∂ usage
∂ κ

< 0

> 0 holds when λ > λ∗D =

always

holds.

−4−5e+14e2 +16e3
e(−4−3e+16e2 +16e3 )

(−1+e)λ(8+e(−2(1+6λ)+e(−19−10λ+e(−8+(9+6e)λ))))
2(1+e)(−4+e(3+8e))q1

; and

∂ harm
∂ κ

∂ dumping
∂ κ
∂ dumping
∂ κ

=
=

<0

> 0 holds when λ < λ∗U =

< 0 holds when λ > λ∗U .

Proof of Proposition 3
Consumer surplus: Taking the partial derivative of ConsumerSurplus w.r.t. environmental sensitivity κ.


21(κ+q1 )
2q1 (8(λ+1)q1 −(12λ+5)q2 )
7(κ+1)
1
Function innovation: ∂ ConsumerSurplus
=
−16λ
+
−
9
−
+
2
2
∂ κ
28
q2 −q1
q1 −2q2
8q −19q2 q1 +7q
1

Fashion innovation:

∂ ConsumerSurplus
∂ κ

Use efficiency innovation:

=

2

−δ(4κ+1)+5κ+2
8δ(δ−2)2 λ+2δ(δ(8δ−19)+7)+2
−
(δ−1)q1
δ(4δ−7)−1

∂ ConsumerSurplus
∂ κ

4(δ−2)

= ((e − 1)(e2 (e(29 − 4e(11e + 8)) + 20)κλ2 + eλ(e(e(2e(32κ +

5) + 44κ + 15) − 22κ + 1) − 8κ − 4) + (4 − e(8e + 3))(4eκ + e + κ + 1)) + 2eq1 (e(4e(5(e2 − 1)λ − 4e) + λ + 10) +
4λ − 3))/(4e(e + 1)(e(8e + 3) − 4)q1 )
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Over the feasible range of parameters of interest, we verify algebraically that
when λ < λ∗CS , and

∂ ConsumerSurplus
∂ κ

Function innovation: λ∗CS =
Fashion innovation: λ∗CS =

∂ ConsumerSurplus
∂ κ

> 0 holds

< 0 holds when λ > λ∗CS .

(−32κq13 +116κq2 q12 −123κq22 q1 +35κq23 −32q14 +128q2 q13 −8q13 −172q22 q12 +35q2 q12 +94q23 q1 −45q22 q1 −q24 +14q23 )
(16q14 −88q2 q13 +168q22 q12 −128q23 q1 +32q24 )
−16δ 3 κ−4δ 3 +48δ 2 κ+15δ 2 −31δκ−13δ−5κ−16δ 4 q1 +54δ 3 q1 −52δ 2 q1 +12δq1 +2q1 −2
8δ 4 q1 −40δ 3 q1 +64δ 2 q1 −32δq1

Use efficiency innovation: λ∗CS =

16e3 −10e+3
20e4 −20e2 +e+4

Social surplus: We take partial derivative of SocialSurplus w.r.t. environmental sensitivity κ.


q2 −8q1 )
7(3κ+2λ+q1 −2)
κ−3)
1
−5
Function innovation: ∂ SocialSurplus
+ 7(
+ 8q22q−1 (5
= 28
∂ κ
q1 −2q2
q1 −q2
19q2 q1 +7q 2
1

Fashion innovation:

∂ SocialSurplus
∂ κ

=

2

2(5−3δ)δ+2
+ δ(4κ+2λ−5)−5κ−2λ+8
(7−4δ)δ+1
(δ−1)q1

4(δ−2)

For function and fashion innovation, we verify algebraically that over the entire feasible range of parameters
of interest,

∂ SocialSurplus
∂ κ

< 0 always holds.

Use efficiency innovation:

∂ SocialSurplus
∂ κ

= ((e − 1)(e2 λ2 (e(2e(2e(7κ − 3) + 8κ − 9) − 13κ + 20) − 4(κ − 6)) −

e(2e − 1)λ(e(e(32κ − 29) + 38κ − 57) + 8κ − 28) + (e(8e + 3) − 4)(e(4κ − 5) + κ − 3)) − 2eq1 (e(2e((e(2e − 1) −
2)λ + 3) + λ + 2) − 3))/(4e(e + 1)(e(8e + 3) − 4)q1 )
For use efficiency innovation, over the feasible range of parameters of interest, we verify algebraically that
∂ SocialSurplus
∂ κ

< 0 holds when λ < λ∗SS , and

∂ SocialSurplus
∂ κ

> 0 holds when λ > λ∗SS .

λ∗SS =(0.5(64e4 κ + 8e4 q1 − 58e4 − 20e3 κ − 4e3 q1 − 27e3 − 66e2 κ − 8e2 q1 + 86e2 + 14eκ
+ 2eq1 + 27e + 8κ − 28))/((e2 − e)(28e3 κ − 12e3 + 16e2 κ − 18e2 − 13eκ + 20e − 4κ + 24))
+ 0.5((512e8 κ2 − 1408e8 κ + 1024e8 κq1 + 64e8 q12 − 928e8 q1 + 1444e8 + 320e7 κ2 − 2976e7 κ
+ 512e7 κq1 − 64e7 q12 − 544e7 q1 + 2220e7 − 1216e6 κ2 + 2816e6 κ − 2048e6 κq1 − 112e6 q12 + 2040e6 q1
− 743e6 − 704e5 κ2 + 6752e5 κ − 928e5 κq1 + 96e5 q12 + 1960e5 q1 − 6040e5 + 896e4 κ2 − 1216e4 κ
+ 1248e4 κq1 + 48e4 q12 − 1204e4 q1 − 2822e4 + 448e3 κ2 − 4640e3 κ + 480e3 κq1 − 32e3 q12 − 1864e3 q1
+ 5012e3 − 192e2 κ2 − 320e2 κ − 224e2 κq1 + 4e2 q12 + 76e2 q1 + 2521e2 − 64eκ2 + 864eκ − 64eκq1
1

+ 464eq1 − 1224e + 128κ − 368)/((e − 1)2 e2 (28e3 κ − 12e3 + 16e2 κ − 18e2 − 13eκ + 20e − 4κ + 24)2 )) 2

Proof of Proposition 4
Function innovation: Based on the optimal solutions given by equation (3), we take partial derivatives of
prices, quantities, and the environmental impact harm, with respect to environmental sensitivity κ. Over
the entire feasible range of parameter space of interest,
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∂ p1
∂ κ

=

1
28



−23λφ + q1



7−7λφ
q1 −2q2

∂ p2
∂ κ

=

1
28



−11λφ + q1



7−7λφ
q1 −2q2

∂ Q1
∂ κ

q1 −2q2 )φ
= − 8q22λ−(19
2
q2 q1 +7q2
1

∂ Q2
∂ κ

+
= − 2λφ
q2



2 )φ
+ 8q82λ−(219q1q−2 q31q+7
−
7
< 0 always holds.
2
q2
1


λ(2q1 −3q2 )φ
+ 816
− 7 < 0 always holds.
q 2 −19q2 q1 +7q 2
1

2

< 0 always holds.

λ(q1 −3q2 )φ
8q12 −19q2 q1 +7q22

7q23 −19q1 q22 +8q12 q2
3 +450q q 2 −740q 2 q +330q 3
−80q1
2 1
2 1
2

; and

+

λφ−1
2(q1 −2q2 )

∂ Q2
∂ κ

< 0 holds when λ >

7q23 −19q1 q22 +8q12 q2
3 φ+45q q 2 φ−74q 2 q φ+33q 3 φ
−8q1
2 1
2 1
2

and φ > φ∗Q =

7q23 −19q1 q22 +8q12 q2
3 φ+45q q 2 φ−74q 2 q φ+33q 3 φ
−8q1
2 1
2 1
2

> 0 holds when φ < φ∗Q , or when λ <

and

φ > φ∗Q .
∂ Q12
∂ κ

=

∂ harm
∂ κ

φ∗E =

1−λφ
2q1 −4q2

=

1
2



−

+ 8q2 −19λqq22 φq1 +7q2 + 2q1 −1 2q2 < 0 always holds.
1

λ2 φ
q2

+

2

2λφ((5λ+1)q2 −3λq1 )
8q12 −19q2 q1 +7q22

λφ−1)
1
+ q1 −q
+ (λ−q1)(
1 −2q2
2



> 0 holds when λ > λ∗E =

7λq24 −26λq1 q23 +27λq12 q22 −8λq13 q2 −21q24 +71q1 q23 −62q12 q22 +16q13 q2
;
8λ2 q14 −45λ2 q2 q13 +79λ2 q22 q12 −43λ2 q23 q1 +λ2 q24 +8λq2 q13 −29λq22 q12 +32λq23 q1 −11λq24

and

∂ harm
∂ κ

3q2 −2q1
q2 −q1

and φ <

< 0 holds when λ < λ∗E

and φ < φ∗E , or when φ > φ∗E . We also find that φ∗Q > φ∗E holds when λ > λ∗E .
Fashion innovation: Based on the optimal solutions given by equation (3), we take partial derivatives of
prices, quantities, and the environmental impact harm, with respect to environmental sensitivity κ. Over
the entire feasible range of parameter space of interest,
∂ p1
∂ κ

δ−11)λφ−4δ +7)+λφ+1
= − δ((δ−2)(8
< 0 always holds.
2(δ−2)(δ (4δ−7)−1)

∂ p2
∂ κ

= − −4δ

2

+(δ−1)(δ (4δ−9)+3)λφ+7δ +1
2(δ−2)(δ (4δ−7)−1)

< 0 always holds.

∂ Q1
∂ κ

δ−2)λφ
= − (δ(42(δ−
< 0 always holds.
7)−1)q1

∂ Q2
∂ κ

=

∂ Q2
∂ κ

−4δ 2 −(δ−3)(δ (4δ−9)+3)λφ+7δ +1
2(δ−2)(δ (4δ−7)−1)q1

< 0 holds when λ >

> 0 holds when φ < φ∗Q , or when λ <

∂ Q12
∂ κ

=

∂ harm
∂ κ

δ (−δ (4δ−13)(λφ−2)−12λφ+19)+3λφ+3
2(δ−2)(δ−1)(δ (4δ−7)−1)q1

=

−4δ 2 +7δ +1
4δ 3 −21δ 2 +30δ−9

−4δ 2 +7δ +1
4δ 3 −21δ 2 +30δ−9

and φ > φ∗Q =

(7−4δ )δ +1
;
(δ−3)(δ (4δ−9)+3)λ

and φ > φ∗Q .

< 0 always holds.

λφ(δ(δ((13−4δ)λ−4)+2λ+9)−23λ−3)
1 −λ+2
+ 1−δ
δ(4δ−7)−1

2(δ−2)q1

−4δ 3 λ+8δ 3 +11δ 2 λ−26δ 2 −6δλ+19δ−λ+3
;
4δ 4 λ2 −17δ 3 λ2 +4δ 3 λ+11δ 2 λ2 −13δ 2 λ+25δλ2 +12δλ−23λ2 −3λ

> 0

and

when

∂ harm
∂ κ

λ > λ∗E =

3−2δ
1−δ

and

φ < φ∗E =

< 0 holds when λ < λ∗E and φ < φ∗E , or when

φ > φ∗E . We also find that φ∗Q > φ∗E holds when λ > λ∗E .
Proof of Proposition 5
The profits under optimal conditions are:
πaware =

and

1
((−1 + e)2 (4(1 + κ)2 + 4e5 κ2 λ2 + 8e4 (−1 + 2κλ)
4(−1 + e)e(1 + e)(−4 + 3e + 8e2 )q1

− e(1 + κ)(−5 + κ(3 + 8λ)) + e3 (−19 + κ2 λ(16 + λ) + 2κ(−8 + 11λ)) + 2e2 (−5 − κ(11 + λ)
+ κ2 (−4 + 3λ + 2λ2 ))) − 4(−1 + e)e(−4(1 + κ) + e2 (11 + κ(8 − 3λ)) + 4e4 κλ
+ e3 (8 − 2κλ) + e(−1 + κ(3 + 2λ)))q1 + 4e(1 + 2e − 6e2 − 4e3 + 4e4 )q12 )
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πunaware =

1
((−1 + e)(4(1 + κ)2 − 4e3 (−1 + κλ)2
4e(−4 + e + 4e2 )q1

− e(1 + κ)(−3 + κ(5 + 8λ)) + e2 (−5 + κ(κ + 2(−4 + λ) + 2κλ(5 + 2λ)))) + 4eq1 (4(1 + κ)
+ e(−1 − 4κ − e(4 + κ) + 3(−1 + e)κλ) + (−1 + (−2 + e)e)q1 ))
The consumer type condition 1 > θ12 > θ1 > θ2 > 0 holds in the use efficiency innovation case when 0 < e < 0.3, q1 >

−4+3e+12e2 −3e3 −8e4 −4κ−eκ+19e2 κ+2e3 κ−16.e4 κ
−2.e−6.e2 +10.e3 +16.e4

, and 0 < λ <

4−3e−12e2 +3e3 +8e4 +4κ+eκ−19e2 κ−2e3 κ+16e4 κ+2eq1 −6e2 q1 −2e3 q1 +8e4 q1
.
4eκ+3e2 κ−15e3 κ−4e4 κ+12e5 κ

(1) Given e = 0.1, the consumer type condition can be guaranteed if λ < 40.
Under this condition, πaware > πunaware holds when 0 < λ < λPπ A∗
1 = 0.00003(8145 + 212558q1 ) −
p
1.11111(−80545q1 +106279λq1 )
P A∗
0.06066 81 − 1764q1 + 9604q12 ; or when λPπ A∗
−
1 < λ < 40 and 0 < κ < κπ 1 (λ) =
−4525−9050λ+18828λ2
q
1600q12 −3920λq12 +2401λ2 q12
2284.37878 (−4525
.
−9050λ+18828λ2 )2
P A∗
πaware < πunaware holds when λPπ A∗
1 < λ < 40 and κπ 1 (λ) < κ < 1.

(2) Given e = 0.2, the consumer type condition can be guaranteed if λ < 20.
Under this condition, πaware > πunaware holds when 0 < λ < λPπ A∗
2 = 0.00157(110 + 1763q1 ) −
p
2.5(−1045q1 +1763λq1 )
P A∗
0.11232 16 − 184q1 + 529q12 ; or when λPπ A∗
−
2 < λ < 20 and 0 < κ < κπ 2 (λ) =
−275−550λ+1597λ2
q
225q 2 −690λq12 +529λ2 q12
179.374 (−2751 −550λ+11597
.
λ2 )2
P A∗
πaware < πunaware holds when λPπ A∗
2 < λ < 20 and κπ 2 (λ) < κ < 1.

(3) Given e = 0.3, the consumer type condition can be guaranteed if λ < 9.
Under this condition, πaware > πunaware holds when 0 < λ < λPπ A∗
3 = 0.00001(12495 + 153194q1 ) −
p
0.47619(−36295q1 +76597λq1 )
P A∗
0.01728 441 − 3444q1 + 6724q12 ; or when λPπ A∗
−
3 < λ < 9 and 0 < κ < κπ 3 (λ) =
−2975−5950λ+25248λ2
q
400q12 −1640λq12 +1681λ2 q12
872.682 (−2975
.
−5950λ+25248λ2 )2
P A∗
πaware < πunaware holds when λPπ A∗
3 < λ < 9 and κπ 3 (λ) < κ < 1.

We can verify algebraically that

A∗
∂ κP
π
∂ λ

< 0 holds for all the 3 cases e = 0.1, e = 0.2, and e = 0.3. Further,

although the exact values of λ and κ thresholds change with the value of e and q1 , there exists a pattern that
for λ less than a threshold, the seller profit from aware consumers is higher than from unaware consumers at
any value of κ; while for λ above a threshold, the seller profit from unaware consumers is higher than from
aware consumers κ above a threshold. Also, the κ threshold decreases with increasing λ.
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Proof of Proposition 6
The environmental harms under optimal conditions are:
harmaware =

1
((−1 + e)(−4(1 + κ) + 2e5 λ(−4 + 3κλ)
2e(1 + e)(−4 + 3e + 8e2 )q1

+ e4 λ(−11 + 3κ(−8 + 3λ)) + e(−1 + κ(−5 + 12λ)) + e2 (11 + 4λ + κ(14 + λ − 12λ2 ))
+ e3 (8 + λ + κ(16 − 35λ − 10λ2 ))) − 2e(1 + e(3 − 5λ) + 2e3 (−4 + λ) + 6λ + 6e4 λ − e2 (5 + 16λ))q1 )

usageaware = (λ((e − 1)(e4 (6κλ − 8) + e3 (9κλ − 8κ − 11) + e2 (−10κλ − 19κ + 1)
− 2e(6κλ + κ − 2) + 8κ) − 2(6e4 + 2e3 − 16e2 − 5e + 6)q1 ))/(2(e + 1)(8e2 + 3e − 4)q1 )
dumpingaware =

(−1 + e)((−4 + e(3 + 8e))(1 + e + κ + 2eκ) + e(4 + e(3 − 16e(1 + e)))κλ) + 2e(−1 + e(1 + e)(−3 + 8e))q1
2e(1 + e)(−4 + 3e + 8e2 )q1

harmunaware =

1
((−1 + e)(e − 4(1 + κ) + 3eκ(−1 + 4λ) + 4e4 λ(−1 + κλ)
2e(−4 + e + 4e2 )q1

+ e3 λ(−1 + κ(−13 + 4λ)) + e2 (4(1 + λ) − 2κ(−4 + 3λ + 5λ2 )))
− 2e(1 + e(2 − 9λ) + 6λ + 3e3 λ − e2 (4 + 3λ))q1 )

 
λ (e − 1) 4e3 (κλ − 1) + e2 (4κλ − 5κ − 1) − 2e(5κλ + 4κ − 2) + 8κ − 6 e3 − e2 − 3e + 2 q1
usageunaware =
2 (4e2 + e − 4) q1
dumpingunaware =

−(−1 + e)(4(1 + κ) + e(−1 + 3κ − 4κλ + 8e2 κλ − 2e(2 + κ(4 + λ)))) + 2e(−1 − 2e + 4e2 )q1
2e(−4 + e + 4e2 )q1

Over the entire feasible range of parameters of interest:
When λ < λ∗[P A] =

4κ−7eκ−5e2 κ+8e3 κ+4q1 −4eq1 −10e2 q1
,
4κ+5eκ−11e2 κ−6e3 κ+8e4 κ

all of the following hold: harmaware > harmunaware ,

usageaware > usageunaware , dumpingaware > dumpingunaware .
When λ > λ∗[P A] , all of the following hold: harmaware < harmunaware , usageaware < usageunaware ,
dumpingaware < dumpingunaware .
Proof of Proposition 7
The consumer and social surpluses under optimal conditions are:
ConsumerSurplusaware = ((e − 1)2 (e2 (e(4e(11e + 8) − 29) − 20)κ2 λ2
+ (e(8e + 3) − 4)(e2 + 2e(2κ2 + κ + 1) + (κ + 1)2 ) − 2eκλ(e(e(2e(16κ + 5)
+ 22κ + 15) − 11κ + 1) − 4(κ + 1))) + 4eq1 ((1 − e)((20e4 − 20e2 + e + 4)κλ
+ e(−2e(e(8κ + 5) + 7) + 10κ + 1) − 3κ + 5)
+ (e(e(e(4e − 5) + 6) + 7) − 5)q1 ))/(8(e − 1)e(e + 1)(e(8e + 3) − 4)q1 )
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SocialSurplusaware = ((e − 1)2 (e2 κλ2 (e(4e(e(7κ − 6) + 4κ − 9) − 13κ + 40) − 4κ + 48)
+ (e(8e + 3) − 4)(−3e2 + 2e(κ(2κ − 5) − 5) + (κ − 7)(κ + 1))
+ 2eλ(−(2e − 1)(e(16e + 19) + 4)κ2 + (e + 1)(2e − 1)(29e + 28)κ
+ 2e(e + 1)(e(8e + 3) − 4))) − 4e(e − 1)q1 (e(42e2 + λ(4e3 (κ − 3) − 2e2 (κ + 2)
− 4e(κ − 8) + κ + 10) + 6eκ + 46e + 2κ − 9) − 3(κ + 4λ + 5))
+ 4e(e(e(e(4e − 3) − 18) − 3) + 7)q12 )/(8(e − 1)e(e + 1)(e(8e + 3) − 4)q1 )
ConsumerSurplusunaware = ((e − 1)2 (−64e6 κ2 λ2 + 16e5 (κλ(κ(λ + 8) + 2) − 1) + 4e4 (κ2 (λ(27λ − 10)
− 20) + 6κ(λ − 1) − 6) − e3 (κ(κ(12λ(λ + 13) − 35) + 60λ + 14) − 23)
+ e2 (κ(κ(8(5 − 6λ)λ + 95) − 24λ + 54) + 39) + 8e(κ(4(κ + 1)λ − 5κ + 2) − 1)
− 16(κ + 1)2 ) + 4eq1 ((e − 1)(4(e − 1)(e + 1)(e(e(8e − 11) − 3) + 4)κλ
+ e(e(−e(4e(8κ + 5) − 41κ + 13) + 24κ + 38) − 43κ + 13) + 4(3κ − 5))
+ (e(e(e(19e − 40) − 4) + 43) − 20)q1 ))/(8(e − 1)e(4e2 + e − 4)2 q1 )
SocialSurplusunaware = (4eq1 ((e − 1)(e(2(e(2e2 + e − 6) + 4)κλ + e2 (−(e(8κ + 84) + κ + 21))
+ 12e(κ + 12) + 6(e(e(4e − 3) − 17) + 9)eλ + 11κ + 84λ + 15) − 12(κ + 4λ + 5))
+ (e + 1)(e(e(e(8e − 11) − 35) + 65) − 28)q1 ) + (e − 1)2 (64e6 λ((κ − 1)κλ + 1)
− 16e5 (κ(κ + 5)λ2 + (κ − 2)(8κ + 1)λ + 3) − 4e4 (κ(κ(λ(25λ − 6) − 14)
− λ(52λ + 43) + 38) + 31λ + 34) + e3 (κ(κ(4λ(9λ + 49) − 19) + 4λ(26λ − 109) + 2)
− 32λ + 37) + e2 (κ(16(κ − 10)λ2 − 24(3κ + 7)λ − 95κ + 258) + 64λ + 241)
+ 8e(κ(−4(κ − 7)λ + 5κ − 2) + 1) + 16(κ − 7)(κ + 1)))/(8(e − 1)e(4e2 + e − 4)2 q1 )

Over

the

entire

feasible

range

of

parameter

space

of

interest,

ConsumerSuplusaware >

ConsumerSuplusunaware and SocialSurplusaware > SocialSurplusunaware always hold.
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Online Appendix
Appendix EC.1:

Robustness Analyses

In this online appendix, we provide robustness checks of our analysis, with four alternative model
specifications:
1. A model where the efficiency-adjusted quality of product j is qj (1 + ej ): that is, the usageinnovation term appears multiplicatively in the numerator with respect to the product quality
(instead of multiplicative in the denominator as with the base model);
2. A model where the quality and use efficiency are additively separated (instead of being multiplicative) in the utility expression, i.e. qj − (1 − ej );
3. A model with two types of consumers: those that feel environmental harm (proportion α),
and those that don’t (proportion 1 − α); and
4. Models with differentiated densities of low- and high-valuation consumers.
EC.1.1.

Multiplicative use efficiency

We first consider the form of multiplicative efficiency in the utility expression: that is, the efficiencyadjusted quality of product j is qj (1 + ej ). As discussed below, the results are consistent with the
main results in the paper.
For the function innovation case, where we set the use efficiency parameter ej to 0, the indifference equations are given by:
θ12 q2 − p2 − κ(1 + λ) = θ12 q1 − κλ
q2 θ2 − p2 = 0
2q1 θ1 − p1 = q2 θ1 − p2
The expression for seller profit is given by:
π=

1
49(κ + q1 )2 49
49(1 + κ)2
4q 2 (4q1 + q2 )
(−196 − 98κ + 51q1 +
+
+ 42q2 +
− 2 1
)
196
q1 − 2q2
q2
−q1 + q2
8q1 − 19q1 q2 + 7q22

Consistent with Proposition 1a, as κ increases, seller profit decreases.
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Proof. We take partial derivative of firm profit π with respect to environmental sensitivity κ.
We verify algebraically that

∂ π
∂ κ

1
= 12 (−1 + qκ+q
+ −q1+κ
) < 0 always holds over the entire feasible
1 −2q2
1 +q2

range of parameter space of interest.
The expression for overall environmental harm is given by:
harm =

7(−1 + λ)(κ + q1 ) 7(1 + κ) 7λ 2q1 (2(−4 + λ)q1 + (5 + 4λ)q2 )
1
(9 + 17λ −
+
−
+
)
14
q1 − 2q2
q1 − q2
q2
8q12 − 19q1 q2 + 7q22

Consistent with Proposition 2a, as κ increases, environmental harm decreases at lower values of
λ, and increases at higher values of λ.
Proof. We take partial derivative of environmental impact harm with respect to environmental sensitivity κ. Over the entire feasible range of parameter space of interest,
1
( 1−λ
2 q1 −2q2

1
+ q1 −q
) < 0 holds when λ <
2

3q2 −2q1 ∂ harm
; ∂κ
q2 −q1

> 0 holds when λ >

∂ harm
∂ κ

=

3q2 −2q1
.
q2 −q1

For the fashion innovation case, where we set the use efficiency parameter ej to 0, the indifference
equations are given by:
θ12 q1 − p2 − κ(λ + 1) = δθ12 q1 − κλ
θ2 q1 − p2 = 0
(1 + δ)q1 θ1 − p1 = q1 θ1 − p2
The expression for seller profit is given by:
π=

(−1 − 7δ + 4δ 2 )(2 − δ + κ)2 − 4(1 + 6δ − 11δ 2 + 4δ 3 )(−2 + δ − κ)q1 + 4(−1 − 5δ + 13δ 2 − 7δ 3 − δ 4 + δ 5 )q12
4(−2 + δ)(−1 + δ)(−1 − 7δ + 4δ 2 )q1

Consistent with Proposition 1a, as κ increases, seller profit decreases.
Proof. We take partial derivative of firm profit π with respect to environmental sensitivity κ.
We verify algebraically that

∂ π
∂ κ

=

2−δ+κ
2+ (−1+δ)q

1

2(−2+δ)

< 0 always holds over the entire feasible range of

parameter space of interest.
The expression for overall environmental harm is given by:

harm =

2(1 + λ + δ 3 (4 + 3λ) − 3δ 2 (4 + 5λ) + δ(8 + 17λ)) δ + κ(−3 + λ) − δκ(−2 + λ) + 3δλ − δ 2 λ − 2(1 + λ)
+
−1 − 7δ + 4δ 2
(−1 + δ)q1



1
2(−2 + δ)

Consistent with Proposition 2a, as κ increases, environmental harm decreases at lower values of
λ, and increases at higher values of λ.
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Total Profit
π

18.2

18.0

Higher λ
Lower λ

17.8

17.6

0.2

Figure EC.1

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

κ

Robustness Analysis 1. Use Efficiency Innovation: Impact of κ on firm profit
(Low λ vs. High λ)

Proof. We take partial derivative of environmental impact harm with respect to environmental
sensitivity κ. Over the entire feasible range of parameter space of interest,
holds when λ <

3−2δ ∂ harm
; ∂κ
1−δ

> 0 holds when λ >

∂ harm
∂ κ

=

−3+2δ+λ−δλ
2(2−3δ+δ 2 )q1

<0

3−2δ
.
1−δ

For the use efficiency innovation case, where we set e1 to 0, and e2 = e, the indifference equations
are given by:
θ12 q1 (1 + e) − p2 − κ(λ(1 − e) + 1) = θ12 q1 − κλ
θ2 q1 (1 + e) − p2 = 0
2q1 θ1 − p1 = q1 (1 + e)θ1 − p2 + κλe
The expression for seller profit is given by:
π =(−e2 (e + 1)(e(e(9e + 14) + 13) + 4)κ2 λ2 − 2e(e + 1)(e(7e − 5) − 4)κλ(e(κ + 2) + κ + 1)
+ (e(7e − 5) − 4)(e(κ + 2) + κ + 1)2 − 4e(e + 1)q1 (e(e((e − 2)e + 3) + 2)κλ + (e(7e − 5) − 4)(e(κ + 2)


+ κ + 1)) + 4e e 3(e − 1)e(e + 2)2 − 7 − 1 q12 )/(4e(e + 1)(2e + 1)(e(7e − 5) − 4)q1 )

Consistent with Proposition 1b, as κ increases, seller profit decreases at lower values of λ, and
increases at higher values of λ. Due to the intractability of the analytical proof, we show this result
graphically. Seller profit changes with increasing κ as shown in Figure EC.1.
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The expression for overall environmental harm is given by:
harm =(2e2 (e(e(31 − 3(e − 3)e) + 25) + 6)κλ2 + eλ((e + 1)(e(e(39e + 2) − 33) − 12)κ
+ 2e(2e + 1)(e(7e − 5) − 4)) + (−e − 1)(e(7e − 5) − 4)(e(3κ + 2) + κ + 1)
− 2e(e + 1)q1 (e(e((10(e − 2)e − 11)λ − 9e + 4)

+ 13λ + 6) + 6λ + 1))/(2e(e + 1)(2e + 1)(e(7e − 5) − 4)q1 )
Consistent with Proposition 2b, as κ increases, environmental harm decreases.
Proof. We take partial derivative of environmental impact harm with respect to environmental
sensitivity κ.

∂ harm
∂ κ

=

e(e(2(e(19−3(e−4)e)+6)λ2 +(e(39e+2)−33)λ−21e+8)−12λ+17)+4
2e(2e+1)(e(7e−5)−4)q1

range of parameter space of interest,
EC.1.2.

∂ harm
∂ κ

. Over the entire feasible

< 0 holds.

Additively separated use efficiency

We then consider a model where the quality and use efficiency are additively separated (instead of
being multiplicative) in the utility expression, i.e. qj − (1 − ej ). As discussed below, the results are
consistent with the main results in the paper.
For the function innovation case, where we set the use efficiency parameter ej to 0, the indifference equations are given by:
θ12 (q2 − 1) − p2 − κ(1 + λ) = θ12 (q1 − 1) − κλ
θ2 (q2 − 1) − p2 = 0
2(q1 − 1)θ1 − p1 = θ1 (q2 − 1) − p2
The expression for seller profit is given by:
π=


1
49(κ + 1)2 49 (κ + q1 − 1) 2
−98κ +
+
+ 51q1 + 42q2
196
q2 − q1
q1 − 2q2 + 1
+

49
4 (q1 − 1) 2 (4q1 + q2 − 5)
− 289)
− 2
q2 − 1 8q1 + (3 − 19q2 ) q1 + q2 (7q2 + 5) − 4

Consistent with Proposition 1a, as κ increases, seller profit decreases.
Proof. We take partial derivative of firm profit π with respect to environmental sensitivity κ.


κ+q1 −1
We verify algebraically that ∂∂ πκ = 12 qκ+1
+
−
1
< 0 always holds over the entire feasible
q1 −2q2 +1
2 −q1
range of parameter space of interest.
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The expression for overall environmental harm is given by:
harm =

1
14
+


17λ −

7(λ − 1) (κ + q1 − 1) 7(κ + 1)
7λ
+
−
q1 − 2q2 + 1
q1 − q2
q2 − 1

2 (q1 − 1) (−6λ + 2(λ − 4)q1 + (4λ + 5)q2 + 3)
+ 9)
8q12 + (3 − 19q2 ) q1 + q2 (7q2 + 5) − 4

Consistent with Proposition 2a, as κ increases, environmental harm decreases at lower values of
λ, and increases at higher values of λ.
Proof. We take partial derivative of environmental impact harm with respect to environmental sensitivity κ. Over the entire feasible range of parameter space of interest,


1−λ
1
1
1 −1
1 −1
+
< 0 holds when λ < 3q2q−2q
; ∂ ∂harm
> 0 holds when λ > 3q2q−2q
.
2 q1 −2q2 +1
q1 −q2
κ
2 −q1
2 −q1

∂ harm
∂ κ

=

For the fashion innovation case, the indifference equations are given by:
θ12 (q1 − 1) − p2 − κ(λ + 1) = δθ12 (q1 − 1) − κλ
θ2 (q1 − 1) − p2 = 0
(1 + δ)(q1 − 1)θ1 − p1 = (q1 − 1)θ1 − p2

The expression for seller profit is given by:
π =(−4(κ + 1)2 + q12 (2δ 2 (2κ2 + κ − 19) + δ(−5κ2 + 90κ + 187) − 23κ2 − 140κ − 173)
+ q13 (δ 3 (24κ + 23) + δ 2 (−8κ2 − 72κ + 59) + δ(13κ2 − 54κ − 350) + 11κ2 + 134κ + 284)
+ q14 (36δ 4 − δ 3 (40κ + 187) + δ 2 (4κ2 + 114κ + 187) + δ(−7κ2 − 34κ + 156) − κ2 − 48κ − 196)
− 4(δ − 1)q15 (δ 4 + 8δ 3 − 4δ 2 (κ + 9) + δ(7κ + 23) + κ + 13) + 4(δ 5 − δ 4 − 7δ 3 + 13δ 2 − 5δ − 1)q16
+ q1 (−δ(κ2 + 26κ + 29) + 17κ2 + 58κ + 45))/(4(δ − 1)(q1 − 1)q1 ((δ − 2)q1 + 1)((4δ 2 − 7δ − 1)q12 − (δ − 9)q1 − 4))

Consistent with Proposition 1a, as κ increases, seller profit decreases.
Proof. We take partial derivative of firm profit π with respect to environmental sensitivity κ. We
verify algebraically that

∂ π
∂ κ

(−3δ+κ+2(δ−1)q1 +4)+1
= − κ−q12(δ−1)q
< 0 always holds over the entire feasible
1 ((δ−2)q1 +1)

range of parameter space of interest.
The expression for overall environmental harm is given by:
harm =(4(κ + 1) + q12 (δ 2 (−κ(λ + 2) + 13λ + 5) + δ(κ(14λ − 23) − 86λ − 33) + κ(49 − 13λ) + 73λ + 52)
+ q13 (δ 3 (4κ(λ − 2) − 15λ − 4) + δ 2 (κ(28 − 10λ) + 11λ − 6) + δ(−κ(4λ + 5) + 107λ + 51)
+ κ(10λ − 31) − 103λ − 57) + 2(δ − 1)q15 (δ 3 (3λ + 4) − 3δ 2 (5λ + 4) + δ(17λ + 8) + λ + 1)
+ q14 (−2δ 4 (5λ + 4) + δ 3 (−4κ(λ − 2) + 67λ + 36) + δ 2 (κ(11λ − 26) − 112λ − 39)
+ δ(κ(19 − 6λ) + 11(λ − 1)) − κ(λ − 3) + 44λ + 26) + q1 (δ(κ(9 − 4λ) + 16λ + 7)
+ κ(4λ − 25) − 16λ − 23))/(2(δ − 1)(q1 − 1)q1 ((δ − 2)q1 + 1)((4δ 2 − 7δ − 1)q12 − (δ − 9)q1 − 4))
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Consistent with Proposition 2a, as κ increases, environmental harm decreases at lower values of
λ, and increases at higher values of λ.
Proof. We take partial derivative of environmental impact harm with respect to environmental sensitivity κ. Over the entire feasible range of parameter space of interest,
q1 (−δ(λ−2)+λ−3)+1
2(δ−1)q1 ((δ−2)q1 +1)

< 0 holds when λ <

2δq1 −3q1 +1 ∂ harm
; ∂κ
δq1 −q1

> 0 holds when λ >

∂ harm
∂ κ

=

2δq1 −3q1 +1
.
δq1 −q1

For the use efficiency innovation case, where we set e1 to 0, and e2 = e, the indifference equations
are given by:
θ12 (q1 − (1 − e)) − p2 − κ(λ(1 − e) + 1) = θ12 (q1 − 1) − κλ
θ2 (q1 − (1 − e)) − p2 = 0
2(q1 − 1)θ1 − p1 = (q1 − (1 − e))θ1 − p2 + κλe

The expression for seller profit is given by:
π =(e6 (12 − κλ(9κλ + 4)) + e5 (κ2 λ(23λ − 14) − 4κ(8λ + 7) − 92) + e4 (κ(κ(9(2 − 3λ)λ + 7) + 18λ + 64)
+ 72) + e3 (κ(κ(λ(17λ + 14) − 9) + 52λ + 6) + 104) − e2 (κ2 (4λ2 + 26λ + 7) + 42κ(λ + 2) + 125)
+ q1 (e5 (κλ(4 − 23κλ) + 36) + 2e4 (κ(λ(9κ(3λ − 1) − 7) − 18) − 22)
− e3 (κ(κ(λ(51λ + 28) − 9) + 124λ + 34) + 264) + 2e2 (κ(κ(λ(8λ + 39) + 7) + 67λ + 110) + 187)
+ q1 (e4 (−κ)λ(27κλ + 4) + e3 (κ(λ(κ(51λ + 14) + 92) + 28) + 208) − e2 (κ2 (6λ(4λ + 13) + 7)
+ 2κ(75λ + 94) + 401) + q1 (e3 (−(κλ(17κλ + 20) + 48)) + 2e2 (κ(λ(κ(8λ + 13) + 33) + 26) + 90)
− 4q1 (e2 (κλ(κλ + 2) + 7) − e(2κ(κλ + λ + 2) + 9) + eq1 + (κ + 1)2 ) − e(κ(32(κ + 1)λ + 13κ + 98) + 125)
+ 16(κ + 1)2 ) + e(3κ(16(κ + 1)λ + 13κ + 66) + 199) − 24(κ + 1)2 ) − e(κ(32(κ + 1)λ
+ 39κ + 166) + 147) + 16(κ + 1)2 ) + e(κ(8(κ + 1)λ + 13κ + 50) + 41)
− 4(κ + 1)2 )/(4e(e + q1 − 1)(2e + q1 − 1)(q1 (−5e − 4q1 + 8) + e(7e + 5) − 4))

Consistent with Proposition 1b, as κ increases, seller profit decreases at lower values of λ, and
increases at higher values of λ. Due to the intractability of the analytical proof, we show this result
graphically. Seller profit changes with increasing κ as shown in Figure EC.2.
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Total Profit
π
18.0
17.9
17.8

Higher λ

17.7

Lower λ

17.6
17.5
17.4
0.2

Figure EC.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

κ

Robustness Analysis 2. Use Efficiency Innovation: Impact of κ on firm profit
(Low λ vs. High λ)

The expression for overall environmental harm is given by:
harm =(2q14 (e2 λ(2κλ + 3) − e(4(κ + 2)λ + 1) + 2(κ + 1)) + q13 (e3 λ(19κλ + 26)
− e2 (8κλ2 + (36κ + 89)λ + 14) + e(7κ(4λ + 3) + 68λ + 25) − 16(κ + 1)) + q12 (26e4 λ(κλ + 1)
− e3 (26κλ2 + 33κλ + 137λ + 20) + e2 (99κλ + 25κ + 244λ + 58) − 9e(4κλ + 7κ + 12λ + 7)
+ 24(κ + 1)) + (1 − e)(2e5 λ(3κλ + 10) − e4 (2κλ2 + (39κ + 56)λ + 18) + e3 (κ(8λ2 − 12λ + 21)
− 24λ + 6) + e2 (κ(−4λ2 + 23λ + 8) + 64λ + 15) − e(4κλ + 17κ + 20λ + 15) + 4(κ + 1)) + q1 (e5 λ(5κλ − 14)
− 2e4 (8κλ2 + (4 − 17κ)λ − 5) + e3 (κ(−5λ2 + 68λ − 13) + 199λ + 29) + e2 (κ(8λ2 − 90λ − 50) − 245λ − 74)
+ e(κ(20λ + 63) + 76λ + 59) − 16(κ + 1)))/(2e(e + q1 − 1)(2e + q1 − 1)(7e2 + (8 − 5e)q1 + 5e − 4q12 − 4))

Consistent with Proposition 2b, as κ increases, environmental harm decreases.
Proof. We take partial derivative of environmental impact harm with respect to environmental sensitivity κ.

∂ harm
∂ κ

2

= − (eλ−1)
−
2e

(λ−1)(eλ−1)
2(2e+q1 −1)

feasible range of parameter space of interest,
20

+

eλ(2(e(e+2)−1)λ+q1 ((e+2)λ+1)+e−1)
.
q1 (−5e−4q1 +8)+e(7e+5)−4

∂ harm
∂ κ

Over the entire

< 0 holds.20

Since the model employs an additive form between q1 and e to measure the effect of e, the boundary conditions for

the feasible range are substantively different from the main model. In this robustness analysis, the feasible market
quantity condition 1 > θ12 > θ1 > θ2 > 0 holds when 0.1q1 < e < 0.3q1 , q1 > 5, 0 < λ < 0.2, and e((e(e(25e + 2) − 15) +
4)κλ+e(3e(6e−7κ−2)−8κ−15)+17κ+15)+q1 (−e(2((e−15)e+6)κλ+e(8e−8κ−27)+34κ+32)+ q1 (e(−3e(5κλ+
4) + 12κλ + 17κ + 19) − 2q1 (2eκλ + e − 2(κ + 1)) − 12(κ + 1)) + 12(κ + 1)) < 4(κ + 1) < e((3e − 1)(e(3e + 7) − 4)κλ +
e(e(2e − 21κ − 6) − 8κ − 3) + 17κ + 11) + q1 (−e(2(e(9e − 19) + 6)κλ + e(8e − 8κ − 3) + 34κ + 20) + q1 (e(κ(−19eλ +
12λ + 17) + 7) + 2q1 (−2eκλ + e + 2κ + 2) − 12(κ + 1)) + 12(κ + 1)).The interpretation of the conditions remains the
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Two consumer types

Here, we generalize the previous model to have consumers who may or may not feel environmental
harm. A fraction α of consumers feel environmental harm (0 < α < 1), whereas the remaining
consumers (1 − α) do not feel environmental harm. As discussed below, the results are consistent
with the main results in the paper.
In this model, only the α fraction of consumers are sensitive to environmental harm and hence
have the disutility related to environmental harm in their utility functions. The other consumers
(i.e., the remaining fraction (1 − α)) do not have environmental-related disutility in their decision
making process. Hence all utility functions for α consumers remain the same as the main model;
the utility functions for (1 − α) consumers are:
f
U11
= θq1

1
1
f
− p1 and U22
= θq2
− p2
1 − e1
1 − e2

o
U12
= θδq1

1
1
o
and U22
= θq2
− p2
1 − e1
1 − e2

The entire market is hence divided into two segments α and (1 − α). The firm applies the same
price for both segments in a period, and maximizes the total profit from the two segments over
two periods. In this analysis, we use θα to denote the α-type consumers’ valuation of the product,
and θ to denote the (1 − α)-type consumers’ valuation. The market quantities are hence given by:
Q1 = α(1 − θα1 ) + (1 − α)(1 − θ1 ), Q2 = α(θα1 − θα2 ) + (1 − α)(θ1 − θ2 ), and Q12 = α(1 − θα12 ) + (1 −
α)(1 − θ12 ).
For the function innovation case, where we set the use efficiency parameter ej to 0, the indifference equations for α consumers are given by:
θα12 q2 − p2 − κ(1 + λ) = θα12 q1 − κλ
q2 θα2 − p2 = 0
2q1 θα1 − p1 = q2 θα1 − p2
same with the main analysis, which says that the innovation degree (measured by e in the use efficiency case) has
both lower and upper bounds, and the value of λ cannot exceed an upper bound.
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And the indifference equations for (1 − α) consumers are given by:
θ12 q2 − p2 = θ12 q1
q2 θ2 − p2 = 0
2q1 θ1 − p1 = q2 θ1 − p2

The expression for seller profit is given by:
1
π=
196



4q12 (4q1 + q2 )
49(ακ + 1)2 49 (ακ + q1 ) 2
49
+
+ 51q1 + 42q2 +
− 2
− 196
−98ακ +
q2 − q1
q1 − 2q2
q2
8q1 − 19q2 q1 + 7q22

Consistent with Proposition 1a, as κ increases, seller profit decreases.
Proof. We take partial derivative of firm profit π with respect to environmental sensitivity κ.
We verify algebraically that

∂ π
∂ κ

=

α(q2 (ακ−2q2 +2)+q1 (2q2 −1))
2(q1 −2q2 )(q1 −q2 )

< 0 always holds over the entire feasible

range of parameter space of interest.
The expression for overall environmental harm is given by:
harm =



1
7(λ − 1) (ακ + q1 ) 7ακ + 7 7λ 2q1 (2(λ − 4)q1 + (4λ + 5)q2 )
+
9
17λ −
+
−
+
14
q1 − 2q2
q1 − q2
q2
8q12 − 19q2 q1 + 7q22

Consistent with Proposition 2a, as κ increases, environmental harm decreases at lower values of
λ, and increases at higher values of λ.
Proof. We take partial derivative of environmental impact harm with respect to environmental sensitivity κ. Over the entire feasible range of parameter space of interest,


−2q1
1
1
1−λ
1
α
+
< 0 holds when λ < 3qq22 −2q
; ∂ ∂harm
> 0 holds when λ > 3qq22 −q
.
2
q1 −2q2
q1 −q2
−q1
κ
1

∂ harm
∂ κ

=

For the fashion innovation case, where we set the use efficiency parameter ej to 0, the indifference
equations for α consumers are given by:
θα12 q1 − p2 − κ(λ + 1) = δθα12 q1 − κλ
θα2 q1 − p2 = 0
(1 + δ)q1 θα1 − p1 = q1 θα1 − p2

And the indifference equations for (1 − α) consumers are given by:
θ12 q1 − p2 = δθ12 q1
θ2 q1 − p2 = 0
(1 + δ)q1 θ1 − p1 = q1 θ1 − p2
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The expression for seller profit is given by:
2

π=

4ακ − 4δ + (ακ−δ+2)
+
(δ−1)q1

4(δ (δ 3 −7δ+6)+1)q1
δ(4δ−7)−1

+8

4(δ − 2)

Consistent with Proposition 1a, as κ increases, seller profit decreases.
Proof. We take partial derivative of firm profit π with respect to environmental sensitivity κ.
We verify algebraically that

∂ π
∂ κ

=

α(ακ−δ+2(δ−1)q1 +2)
2(δ−2)(δ−1)q1

< 0 always holds over the entire feasible range

of parameter space of interest.
The expression for overall environmental harm is given by:

harm =

2((3(δ−5)δ+17)δλ+4(δ−2)(δ−1)δ+λ+1)
δ(4δ−7)−1

+ −(δ−1)λ(ακ+δ−2)+2αδκ−3ακ+δ−2
(δ−1)q1

2(δ − 2)

Consistent with Proposition 2a, as κ increases, environmental harm decreases at lower values of
λ, and increases at higher values of λ.
Proof. We take partial derivative of environmental impact harm with respect to environmental sensitivity κ. Over the entire feasible range of parameter space of interest,
α(−δ(λ−2)+λ−3)
2(δ−2)(δ−1)q1

< 0 holds when λ <

3−2δ ∂ harm
; ∂κ
1−δ

> 0 holds when λ >

∂ harm
∂ κ

=

3−2δ
.
1−δ

For the use efficiency innovation case, where we set e1 to 0, and e2 = e, the indifference equations
for α consumers are given by:
θα12

q1
− p2 − κ(λ(1 − e) + 1) = θα12 q1 − κλ
1−e
q1
θα2
− p2 = 0
1−e
q1
2q1 θα1 − p1 =
θα1 − p2 + κλe
1−e

And the indifference equations for (1 − α) consumers are given by:
q1
− p2 = θ12 q1
1−e
q1
θ2
− p2 = 0
1−e
q1
2q1 θ1 − p1 =
θ1 − p2
1−e

θ12
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Total Profit
π

19.9

Higher λ

19.8

Lower λ
19.7

19.6
0.2

Figure EC.3

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

κ

Robustness Analysis 3. Use Efficiency Innovation: Impact of κ on firm profit
(Low λ vs. High λ)

The expression for seller profit is given by:
π =(4eq1 ((e − 1)(αe(e(−4e2 + 2e + 3) − 2)κλ
+ (4 − e(8e + 3))(ακ + e + 1)) + (2e(e + 1)(2(e − 2)e + 1) + 1)q1 )
+ (e − 1)2 (α2 e2 (4e3 + e + 4)κ2 λ2 + 2αe(e(8e + 3) − 4)κλ(ακ + e + 1)
+ (4 − e(8e + 3))(ακ + e + 1)2 ))/(4(e − 1)e(e + 1)(e(8e + 3) − 4)q1 )

Consistent with Proposition 1b, as κ increases, seller profit decreases at lower values of λ, and
increases at higher values of λ. Due to the intractability of the analytical proof, we show this result
graphically. Seller profit changes with increasing κ as shown in Figure EC.3.
The expression for overall environmental harm is given by:
harm =((e − 1)(αe2 (e(6e2 + 9e − 10) − 12)κλ2 − e(e + 1)λ(α(e(24e + 11) − 12)κ
+ e(e(8e + 3) − 4)) + (e(8e + 3) − 4)(ακ + 2αeκ + e + 1)) − 2eq1 (e(e(2(3e2 + e − 8)λ − 8e − 5)
− 5λ + 3) + 6λ + 1))/(2e(e + 1)(e(8e + 3) − 4)q1 )

Consistent with Proposition 2b, as κ increases, environmental harm decreases.
Proof. We take partial derivative of environmental impact harm with respect to environmental
sensitivity κ.
∂ harm
=(2α(e − 1)(e + 1)2 (e(8e + 3) − 4)(q1 (e(e(λ(6e2 λ − e(λ + 26) − 6λ − 8) + 20) + 12λ + 1) − 6)
∂ κ
+ (e − 1)(e(e(λ(e((4e − 3)λ − 16) − 6λ − 4) + 8) + 10λ + 3) − 4)))
/(e((e − 1)(αe(e(2e − 7) − 8)κλ + (e(8e + 3) − 4)(−ακ + e + 1)) + 2(e(3e(2e + 5) + 2) − 6)q1 )2 )

Over the entire feasible range of parameter space of interest,

∂ harm
∂ κ

< 0 holds.
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In addition, we also provide the results for how prices, quantities, profits and environmental
harms change with α, which show that the market fraction parameter α affects the market in a
way similar to κ:

21

Price and quantities:
As α increases, Function and fashion innovation:
Period 1: price (p1 ) decreases; quantity (Q1 = 1 − θ1 ) does not change.
Period 2: price (p2 ) decreases; new purchase quantity (Q2 = θ1 − θ2 ) increases; upgrade quantity
(Q12 = 1 − θ12 ) decreases.
Use efficiency innovation:
Period 1: Both price (p1 ) and quantity (Q1 = 1 − θ1 ) decrease.
Period 2:
At lower values of λ: price (p2 ) decreases; new purchase quantity (Q2 = θ1 − θ2 ) increases; and
upgrade quantity (Q12 = 1 − θ12 ) decreases.
At higher values of λ: price (p2 ) increases; new purchase quantity (Q2 = θ1 − θ2 ) increases; and
upgrade quantity (Q12 = 1 − θ12 ) increases.
Profit:
Function and fashion innovation: As α increases, firm profit decreases.
Use efficiency innovation: As α increases, (i) at lower values of λ, firm profit decreases; and (ii)
at higher values of λ, firm profit increases.
Environmental harm:
Function and fashion innovation: As α increases, (i) dumping harm decreases; (ii) in-use harm
increases; (iii) total harm decreases at lower values of λ, and increases at higher values of λ.
Use efficiency innovation: As α increases,
At lower values of λ: (i) dumping harm decreases; (ii) in-use harm increases; (iii) total harm
decreases.
At higher values of λ: (i) dumping harm increases; (ii) in-use harm decreases; (iii) total harm
decreases.
21

Proofs of these results are available upon request.
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EC.1.4.
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Differentiated densities of low- and high-valuation consumers

In the main model, we assume that consumers are uniformly distributed through the lowest valuation 0 to the highest valuation 1 – that is, the density function of θ is f (θ) = 1, f or θ ∈ [0, 1]. We
also provide two other distributions to reflect differentiated densities of low- and high-valuation
consumers. The first alternative distribution describes a high density of low-valuation consumers
and a low density of high-valuation consumers, of which the density function of θ is as follows:




 32 if θ ∈ [0, 12 )
f (θ) =



 1 if θ ∈ [ 1 , 1]
2

2

Consumers’ utility functions and the indifference equations remain the same with the main model,
whereas the market quantities now reflect the differentiated densities: the fraction of consumers
who purchase in period 1 is 12 (1 − θ1 ), the fraction of consumers who upgrade is 12 (1 − θ12 ), and the
fraction of consumers who are first time buyers in period 2 is 12 (θ1 − 12 ) + 23 ( 12 − θ2 ).22
The second alternative distribution describes a low density of low-valuation consumers and a
high density of high-valuation consumers, of which the density function of θ is as follows:




 21 if θ ∈ [0, 12 )
f (θ) =



 3 if θ ∈ [ 1 , 1]
2

2

Consumers’ utility functions and the indifference equations remain the same with the main model,
whereas the market quantities now reflect the differentiated densities: the fraction of consumers
who purchase in period 1 is 32 (1 − θ1 ), the fraction of consumers who upgrade is 32 (1 − θ12 ), and the
fraction of consumers who are first time buyers in period 2 is 32 (θ1 − 12 ) + 21 ( 12 − θ2 ).
As discussed below, with the alternative distributions, all results are consistent with the main
results in the paper.
For the function innovation case, we set the use efficiency parameter ej to 0.
22

Based on the conditions of feasible market quantities, we prove that for both alternative distributions in this

robustness analysis, θ12 and θ1 are always in [ 21 , 1] and θ2 is always in [0, 12 ).
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For the distribution of high low-valuation consumer density and low high-valuation consumer
density, the expression for seller profit is given by:
π=

1
(q 2 q 2 (3(8κ2 + 150κ + 517) − 6(67κ + 442)q2 + 97q22 )
8(3q1 − 4q2 )(q1 − q2 )q2 (24q12 − 43q2 q1 + 15q22 ) 2 1
− q23 q1 (43κ2 + 434κ − 6(58κ + 277)q2 + 241q22 + 1048) + q2 q13 (−9(16κ + 107) + 18(8κ + 99)q2 + 385q22 )
+ q24 (15(κ + 4)2 − 90(κ + 4)q2 + 71q22 t) + 144q2 q15 − 24(19q22 + 18q2 − 9)q14 )

For the distribution of low low-valuation consumer density and high high-valuation consumer
density, the expression for seller profit is given by:
π=

1
(3q 2 q 2 (24κ2 + 130κ − 10(41κ + 70)q2 + 49q22 + 135)
8(q1 − 4q2 )(q1 − q2 )q2 (8q12 − 33q2 q1 + 13q22 ) 2 1
− q23 q1 (297κ2 + 870κ − 10(138κ + 197)q2 + 419q22 + 632) + q2 q13 (−48κ + 10(24κ + 73)q2 + 371q22 − 97)
+ q24 (13(3κ + 4)2 − 130(3κ + 4)q2 + 133q22 ) + 48q2 q15 − 8(35q22 + 10q2 − 1)q14 )

Consistent with Proposition 1a, as κ increases, seller profit decreases.
Proof. We take partial derivative of firm profit π with respect to environmental sensitivity κ.
We verify algebraically that for the distribution of high low-valuation consumer density and low


4(κ+1)
12κ+9q1
1
+
−
3
< 0 always holds over the entire
high-valuation consumer density, ∂∂ πκ = 16
q2 −q1
3q1 −4q2
feasible range of parameter space of interest. For the distribution of low low-valuation consumer


4(κ+1)
4κ+5q1
3
density and high high-valuation consumer density, ∂∂ πκ = 16
+
−
5
< 0 always holds
q2 −q1
q1 −4q2
over the entire feasible range of parameter space of interest.
For the distribution of high low-valuation consumer density and low high-valuation consumer
density, the expression for overall environmental harm is given by:
harm =

1
(3q2 q13 (3(−8κ(λ − 2) + 99λ + 8) − (269λ + 178)q2 )
4(3q1 − 4q2 )(q1 − q2 )q2 (24q12 − 43q2 q1 + 15q22 )
+ 3q22 q12 (67κλ − 142κ − 442λ + (429λ + 239)q2 − 75) + q23 q1 (−174κλ + 391κ + 831λ
− (853λ + 410)q2 + 217) + q24 (15(3κλ − 7κ − 12λ − 4) + (193λ + 83)q2 ) + 36q14 ((5λ + 4)q2 − 6λ))

For the distribution of low low-valuation consumer density and high high-valuation consumer
density, the expression for overall environmental harm is given by:
harm =

1
(q2 q13 (−24κ(λ − 2) + 73λ − (353λ + 354)q2 + 24)
4(q1 − 4q2 )(q1 − q2 )q2 (8q12 − 33q2 q1 + 13q22 )
+ 3q22 q12 (κ(41λ − 106) − 70λ + (411λ + 281)q2 − 65) + q23 q1 (κ(573 − 138λ) + 197λ
− (1267λ + 726)q2 + 435) + q24 (39κ(λ − 5) − 52(λ + 3) + (359λ + 189)q2 ) + 4q14 ((7λ + 12)q2 − 2λ))
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Consistent with Proposition 2a, as κ increases, environmental harm decreases at lower values of
λ, and increases at higher values of λ.
Proof. We take partial derivative of environmental impact harm with respect to environmental sensitivity κ. Over the entire feasible range of parameter space of interest, for the distribution of high low-valuation consumer density and low high-valuation consumer density,
3(λ−1)
4(4q2 −3q1 )

+

1
4q1 −4q2

< 0 holds when λ <

7q2 −6q1 ∂ harm
; ∂κ
3q2 −3q1

> 0 holds when λ >

7q2 −6q1
.
3q2 −3q1

∂ harm
∂ κ

=

For the distri-

bution of low low-valuation consumer density and high high-valuation consumer density,


−2q1 ∂ harm
3
1−λ
1
1
+
< 0 holds when λ < 5qq22 −q
; ∂ κ > 0 holds when λ > 5qq22 −2q
.
4 q1 −4q2
q1 −q2
−q1
1

∂ harm
∂ κ

=

For the fashion innovation case, we set the use efficiency parameter ej to 0.
For the distribution of high low-valuation consumer density and low high-valuation consumer
density, the expression for seller profit is given by:
2

π=

δ +κ+4)
−179)+126)+9)q1
6(−3δ + κ + 4) + (−(3δ−
+ (δ(δ(12δ(3δ3+1)
1)q1
δ (4δ−5)−1

8(3δ − 4)

For the distribution of low low-valuation consumer density and high high-valuation consumer
density, the expression for seller profit is given by:
2

π=

3κ−4)
3)(δ (6δ−19)−5)q1
−10(δ − 3κ − 4) + (δ−
+ (δ+5)(2δ−
(δ−1)q1
δ (4δ−13)−3

8(δ − 4)

Consistent with Proposition 1a, as κ increases, seller profit decreases.
Proof. We take partial derivative of firm profit π with respect to environmental sensitivity κ.
We verify algebraically that for the distribution of high low-valuation consumer density and low
high-valuation consumer density,

∂ π
∂ κ

=

−3δ+κ+3(δ−1)q1 +4
4(δ−1)(3δ−4)q1

< 0 always holds over the entire feasible

range of parameter space of interest. For the distribution of low low-valuation consumer density
and high high-valuation consumer density,

∂ π
∂ κ

=

3(−δ+3κ+5(δ−1)q1 +4)
4(δ−4)(δ−1)q1

< 0 always holds over the entire

feasible range of parameter space of interest.
For the distribution of high low-valuation consumer density and low high-valuation consumer
density, the expression for overall environmental harm is given by:
harm =

δ (3δ (6δ (5λ+4)−89λ−52)+190λ+77)+7λ+5
3δ (4δ−5)−1

4)+6δκ+3δ−7κ−4
+ −3(δ−1)λ(3δ+(κ−
δ−1)q1

4(3δ − 4)
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For the distribution of low low-valuation consumer density and high high-valuation consumer
density, the expression for overall environmental harm is given by:
harm =

(δ (δ (14δ−157)+362)+33)λ+3(δ−3)(4δ (2δ−5)−3)
δ (4δ−13)−3

−(δ−1)λ(δ +3κ−4)
+ 3(2δκ+δ−5κ−(4)
δ−1)q1

4(δ − 4)

Consistent with Proposition 2a, as κ increases, environmental harm decreases at lower values of
λ, and increases at higher values of λ.
Proof. We take partial derivative of environmental impact harm with respect to environmental sensitivity κ. Over the entire feasible range of parameter space of interest, for the
distribution of high low-valuation consumer density and low high-valuation consumer density,
∂ harm
∂ κ

=

−3δλ+6δ+3λ−7
4(3δ 2 −7δ+4)q1

< 0 holds when λ <

6δ−7 ∂ harm
; ∂κ
3δ−3

> 0 holds when λ >

6δ−7
.
3δ−3

For the distri-

bution of low low-valuation consumer density and high high-valuation consumer density,
3(−δ(λ−2)+λ−5)
4(δ−4)(δ−1)q1

< 0 holds when λ <

2δ−5 ∂ harm
; ∂κ
δ−1

> 0 holds when λ >

∂ harm
∂ κ

=

2δ−5
.
δ−1

For the use efficiency innovation case, we set e1 = 0 and e2 = e.
For the distribution of high low-valuation consumer density and low high-valuation consumer
density, the expression for seller profit is given by:
π=

1
((e − 1)2 (e2 (36e3 + 9e + 4)κ2 λ2
8(e − 1)e(3e + 1)(e(24e − 5) − 4)q1
+ 2e(e(24e − 5) − 4)κλ(3e + κ + 1) + (4 − e(24e − 5))(3e + κ + 1)2 )
+ eq1 ((e(24(6e − 11)e2 + e + 44) + 4)q1 + 2(e − 1)(e(−72e3 + 60e2 + e − 8)κλ
− 3(e(24e − 5) − 4)(3e + κ + 1))))

For the distribution of low low-valuation consumer density and high high-valuation consumer
density, the expression for seller profit is given by:
π=

1
(−2e(e − 1)q1 (3e(e(8e2 + 4e − 37) + 24)κλ
8(e − 1)e(e + 3)(e(8e + 17) − 12)q1
+ 5(e(8e + 17) − 12)(e + 3κ + 3)) + (e − 1)2 (3e2 (4e3 − 15e + 36)κ2 λ2
+ 6e(e(8e + 17) − 12)κλ(e + 3κ + 3) + (12 − e(8e + 17))(e + 3κ + 3)2 )
+ (e − 2)e(4e + 3)(e(12e + 25) − 18)q12 )

Consistent with Proposition 1b, as κ increases, seller profit decreases at lower values of λ, and
increases at higher values of λ.
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Proof. We take partial derivative of firm profit π with respect to environmental sensitivity κ. Over the entire feasible range of parameter space of interest, for the distribution of
high low-valuation consumer density and low high-valuation consumer density,

∂ π
∂ κ

= ((e −

1)(e2 (36e3 + 9e + 4)κλ2 + e(e(24e − 5) − 4)λ(3e + 2κ + 1) + (4 − e(24e − 5))(3e + κ + 1)) +
eq1 (e(e(12(5 − 6e)eλ + λ − 72) − 8λ + 15) + 12))/(4e(3e + 1)(e(24e − 5) − 4)q1 ) < 0 holds when
λ<

1
(72e5 q1 − 72e5 − 48e4 κ − 60e4 q1 + 63e4 + 58e3 κ − e3 q1 + 26e3 − 2e2 κ +
2(36e6 κ−36e5 κ+9e4 κ−5e3 κ−4e2 κ)

8e2 q1 − 13e2 − ((−72e5 q1 + 72e5 + 48e4 κ + 60e4 q1 − 63e4 − 58e3 κ + e3 q1 − 26e3 + 2e2 κ − 8e2 q1 + 13e2 +
8eκ + 4e)2 − 4(36e6 κ − 36e5 κ + 9e4 κ − 5e3 κ − 4e2 κ)(−72e4 − 24e3 κ − 72e3 q1 + 63e3 + 29e2 κ + 15e2 q1 +
1

26e2 − eκ + 12eq1 − 13e − 4κ − 4)) 2 − 8eκ − 4e);

∂ π
∂ κ

> 0 holds when λ is greater than this threshold.

For the distribution of low low-valuation consumer density and high high-valuation consumer
density,

∂ π
∂ κ

= (3(e − 1)(e2 (4e3 − 15e + 36)κλ2 + e(e(8e + 17) − 12)λ(e + 6κ + 3) + (12 − e(8e + 17))(e +

3κ + 3)) − 3eq1 (e(e((8e2 + 4e − 37)λ + 40) + 24λ + 85) − 60))/(4e(e + 3)(e(8e + 17) − 12)q1 ) < 0
holds when λ <

1
(24e5 q1
2(12e6 κ−12e5 κ−45e4 κ+153e3 κ−108e2 κ)

− 24e5 − 144e4 κ + 12e4 q1 − 99e4 − 162e3 κ −

111e3 q1 + 6e3 + 522e2 κ + 72e2 q1 + 225e2 − ((−24e5 q1 + 24e5 + 144e4 κ − 12e4 q1 + 99e4 + 162e3 κ +
111e3 q1 − 6e3 − 522e2 κ − 72e2 q1 − 225e2 + 216eκ + 108e)2 − 4(12e6 κ − 12e5 κ − 45e4 κ + 153e3 κ −
108e2 κ)(−24e4 − 72e3 κ − 120e3 q1 − 99e3 − 81e2 κ − 255e2 q1 + 6e2 + 261eκ + 180eq1 + 225e − 108κ −
1

108)) 2 − 216eκ − 108e);

∂ π
∂ κ

> 0 holds when λ is greater than this threshold.

For the distribution of high low-valuation consumer density and low high-valuation consumer
density, the expression for overall environmental harm is given by:
harm =

1
((e − 1)(e2 (e(3e(18e + 5) − 64) − 20)κλ2
4e(3e + 1)(e(24e − 5) − 4)q1
+ eλ(e(3e(−72e2 − 9(8e + 3)κ + 39e + 23) + 59κ − 22) + 20κ − 8)
+ (e(24e − 5) − 4)(e(6κ + 3) + κ + 1))
+ eq1 (e(e(3e((53 − 60e)λ + 48) + 130λ − 42) − 44λ − 21) − 20λ + 2))
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For the distribution of low low-valuation consumer density and high high-valuation consumer
density, the expression for overall environmental harm is given by:
harm =

1
((e − 1)(3e2 (e(e(6e + 31) + 8) − 84)κλ2
4e(e + 3)(e(8e + 17) − 12)q1
− eλ(e(e(e(8e + 72κ + 57) + 339κ + 121) + 303κ + 42) − 36(7κ + 2))
+ 3(e(8e + 17) − 12)(2eκ + e + 3κ + 3)) + eq1 (e(e(e(48 − (28e + 111)λ)
+ 2(59λ + 81)) + 468λ + 69) − 18(14λ + 5)))

Consistent with Proposition 2b, as κ increases, environmental harm decreases.
Proof. We take partial derivative of environmental harm harm with respect to
environmental sensitivity κ. We verify algebraically that for the distribution of high
low-valuation

consumer

density

and

low

high-valuation

consumer

∂ harm
∂ κ

density,

=

2

(e−1)(e(e((e(3e(18e+5)−64)−20)λ +(59−27e(8e+3))λ+144e−6)+20λ−29)−4)
4e(3e+1)(e(24e−5)−4)q1

entire

feasible

low-valuation

range

of

consumer

parameter
density

and

< 0

space

of

interest.

high

high-valuation

For

always
the

consumer

holds

over

distribution

of

density,

∂ harm
∂ κ

the
low
=

2

3(e−1)(e(e((e(e(6e+31)+8)−84)λ −(e(24e+113)+101)λ+16e+58)+84λ+27)−36)
4e(e+3)(e(8e+17)−12)q1

< 0 always holds over the entire

feasible range of parameter space of interest.

Appendix EC.2:
EC.2.1.

Additional Insights

Fashion Depreciation

For the fashion innovation, the initial version of the product would decay in its perceived value
when a new version is introduced in period 2, because of the depreciation in terms of fashion. In
this section, we provide additional insights into the role of the fashion depreciation factor (δ) in
affecting our main results.
The depreciation factor δ is between 0 and 1, and a lower value of δ indicates a higher degree of
depreciation in the perceived quality. Our main results show that in the fashion innovation case,
firm profit decreases with consumers’ increasing environmental sensitivity (κ), and environmental
harm decreases with κ when the use-dump harm ratio λ is low but increases with κ when λ is
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high. We show the role of the depreciation factor δ regarding these two results in Figure EC.4 and
Figure EC.5, in which we assign 3 different values (high, medium, and low) to δ and compare the
corresponding profits and environmental harms.
As the depreciation factor becomes smaller; i.e., fashion depreciation of the old product becomes
higher, the firm profit becomes larger. This result is intuitive since with a higher degree of fashion
innovation (which leads to higher degree of depreciation), the firm should be able to set higher
prices and make more profit.
For the environmental harm, we consider a low λ case and a high λ case. In our main model, at
lower values of λ, environmental harm decreases with κ, and at higher values of λ, environmental
harm increases with κ. In Figure EC.5a, lower values of the depreciation factor δ lead to more
environmental harm. This is because in the low use-dump harm ratio case, dumping presents more
harm than usage. High fashion depreciation would lead to more purchase of the upgraded product
and hence more dumping, which brings about worse environmental impact. In contrast, Figure
EC.5b shows that in the high λ case, high fashion depreciation is associated with less harm.
Our analysis shows that when fashion depreciation becomes higher (i.e., the value of depreciation
factor becomes lower), prices in both period 1 and period 2 would rise. The high prices then reduce
the first-time purchase in both periods, while the high depreciation induces more upgrades. In other
words, only the upgrade quantity in period 2 would increase with the degree of depreciation. We find
that the dumping harm increases and the in-use harm decreases with depreciation degree over the
feasible range of parameters, because of the increasing upgrade quantity and the decreasing firsttime purchase. Therefore, when λ is low and the dumping harm dominates the overall environmental
harm, a high depreciation is associated with more overall harm. When λ is large and the in-use
harm becomes dominant, a high depreciation is associated with less overall harm.
Additionally, we show the effects of δ on social surplus in Figure EC.6. Overall, lower values of δ
(higher degree of fashion depreciation) are associated with both lower consumer and social surplus.
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Firm Profit
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Fashion Innovation: Role of depreciation factor for firm profit

Environmental Harm (with Low λ)

Environmental Harm (with High λ)

Env.Impact

Env.Impact
14.0

1.00

13.9
0.95

13.8

0.90

13.7

High δ
Medium δ

High δ

13.6

Medium δ

Low δ

0.85

Low δ

13.5

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

κ

(a) Lower λ: Environmental harm decreases with κ
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(b) Higher λ: Environmental harm increases with κ
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Consumer Surplus (with Low λ)

Consumer Surplus (with High λ)
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(a) Lower λ: Consumer surplus increases with κ
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(b) Higher λ: Consumer surplus decreases with κ
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(c) Lower λ: Social surplus decreases with κ
Figure EC.6
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(d) Higher λ: Social surplus decreases with κ
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